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Preface 
Oscar Jaszi, to Hungarians known as Oszkar Jaszi, was the leading fig-
ure in turn-of-the century Hungary 's bourgeois radical movement. He was 
born on March 2, 1875, in the city of Nagykaroly (today's Satu Mare, in 
northeastern Rumania). His father was a Jewish doctor who had converted 
to the Reformed faith and who instilled in his son a love for learning and 
a sympathy for the common people. Jaszi completed his higher education 
in Hungary, France and England, and by 1911 he was teaching as a lec-
turer in constitutional studies at the University of Kolozsvar (today's Cluj, 
in Rumania). By this time he had also become prominent in Hungary 's 
non-Marxist radical reform movement. He was one of the founders and 
sustainers of the Tarsadalomtudomanyi Tarsasag (Sociological Society) and 
became the editor of the reformist periodical, Huszadik Szazad (Twentieth 
Century). He also published numerous pamphlets and some longer studies 
on subjects relating to sociology, politics and what nowadays is known as 
"ethnic studies." Still later he was elected president of the National Radi-
cal Party. In the short-lived postwar revolutionary government of Mihaly 
Karolyi, Jaszi was the minister in charge of nationality affairs, and shoul-
dered the difficult task of negotiating with Hungary 's national minorities 
at a time when the country, indeed the whole of the Austro-Hungarian 
Dual-Monarchy, was disintegrating. 
Jaszi was unable to stop this process of disintegration. He resigned 
from his post and, several weeks after the collapse of the Karolyi regime, 
left Hungary to begin his long exile, the first leg of which took him to 
Vienna. Here, he worked feverishly to organize the democratic elements 
of the Hungarian emigration. For some time he edited the Becsi Magyar 
Ujsag (Hungarian Newspaper of Vienna). He tried to establish contacts 
with the leaders of the Successor States (Hungary 's new neighbours), in 
preparation for a possible takeover by democratic forces in Hungary and a 
subsequent rapprochement between that country and its neighbours. When 
it became evident that the leaders of the Successor States were not interested 
in supporting Jaszi ' s (and Karolyi 's) aspirations, he made plans to abandon 
his avocation of full-time political emigre and sought employment as an 
academic in the United States. In 1925 he succeeded, and from that t ime 
until his retirement after the war, he taught at Ohio's Oberlin College. Both 
during the time of his Viennese exile, and during his life as an emigre 
academic in America, Jaszi conducted a war of words against what he 
called "unreformed" and "feudal" Hungary and its postwar leadership, in 
particular, Admiral Miklos Horthy. Jaszi 's aspirations —the creation of a 
democratic Hungary, an equitable revision of the territorial provisions of 
the postwar Treaty of Trianon and rapprochement between Hungary and 
its neighbours — were never realized. His hope that the Second World War 
might bring about the achievement of his dreams was dashed by the war ' s 
after-effects: the further growth of chauvinism in Czechoslovakia, Rumania 
and Yugoslavia, and the coming of Soviet domination over East Central 
Europe. Jaszi died a disappointed but unrepentant democrat in Oberlin on 
13 February 1957. He had outlived, by a few days, his post-1919 political 
nemesis, Miklos Horthy. 
* * * * * 
Jaszi has been a controversial figure not only in the realm of Hungar-
ian politics, but also in historiography. Early assessments of him as a 
thinker and a political activist had been negative, no doubt because as a 
cosmopolitan intellectual who had served a revolutionary regime, he was 
an anathema in post-1920 "counter-revolutionary" Hungary. His advocacy 
of radical land reform, his opposition to the privileges of the feudal ruling 
class, his criticism of the Roman Catholic Church's role in education, his 
befriending of the leaders of the non-Magyar minorities, were deeds that 
doomed him an opponent of a " Christian-National" Hungary.1 After the 
passing of the Horthy era in Hungary at the end of the Second World War, 
a different assessment emerged of Jaszi in a liberal, post-war Hungary. He 
now came to be seen as a democrat and a reformer in the tradition of the 
Enlightenment and nineteenth century liberalism. This view of Jaszi was 
soon to change however. After the imposition in Hungary of a communist 
dictatorship under Matyas Rakosi, communist historians declared Jaszi a 
man with petit-bourgeois ideas who, as time went on, became increasingly 
opposed to true proletarian socialism.2 
The dark days of Stalinism were fortunately not long lasting in the Hun-
garian People's Republic. In the 1960s winds of change began to be felt in 
the country and, especially, the world of Hungarian scholarship. Increas-
ingly, non-communist progressives became acceptable to the regime and 
all sorts of reformers of the Magyar past were co-opted into the pantheon 
of the nation's heroes. As one contemporary historian argued, Hungary 
was not so richly endowed with social and political reformers that she 
could afford to disown Jaszi.3 Indeed, from the 1960s on, Jaszi's reception 
by Hungarian scholarship became more and more positive. Of course, he 
was still criticized for not accepting a Marxist viewpoint, but the fact that 
he had been an opponent of the Communists throughout his life was not 
voiced. On the contrary, his anti-communism was sometimes glossed over 
by historians dealing with him.4 And, as intellectual dissent in socialist 
Hungary increased, it became more and more fashionable to praise people 
who sought a road to reform that did not involve the bloody revolutionary 
path advocated by the Soviets. By the mid-1980s, when Hungarian schol-
ars could endorse anyone except outright counter-revolutionaries, Jaszi had 
become an attractive focus for research and reflection. As a result, his 
reputation reached new heights. It is probably safe to assume that Jaszi ' s 
historical stature had peaked at the end of the 1980s, as it seems unlikely 
that in post-communist Hungary a critic of capitalism and an associate of 
Mihaly Karolyi would continue to have a camp of enthusiastic admirers. 
Because most of the papers in this volume were produced in the period 
that Jaszi 's historical figure stood at its highest, this collection of essays 
might well constitute a tribute to him the like of which has not appeared 
in the past and might not appear in the future. 
East Central Europe has only recently lived through experiments with 
radical socialism and with official anti-clericalism, and has been left with 
the bitter after-taste of these explorations in alternate politics. As a result, 
Jaszi the left-leaning reformer and critic of the Church might not be the 
figure that will solicit praise from the present generation of historians. On 
the other hand, Jaszi the advocate of East Central European reconciliation 
and integration will no doubt continue to receive attention in the future. His 
dream of a federated Danubian Europe remains unfulfilled. At the same 
time, the division of that part of the world into competing and potentially 
quarrelsome independent states will no doubt be seen as the major weakness 
of the region. As the problems of disunity will probably plague East Central 
Europe for some time to come, Jaszi will be remembered as one of those 
few who had proposed to prevent that disunity as soon as it became evident 
that the old Habsburg Empire was not acceptable to its component nations. 
Jaszi then, will most likely continue to have his admirers, if for no other 
major reason than for his advocacy of Danubian federalism. And, we can 
also predict with reasonable assurance, that he will remain a controversial 
figure of modern Hungarian history. 
* * * Sf: 
Most of the papers in this volume were prepared for a conference dedicated 
to the memory of Oscar Jaszi that had been held at Jaszi's American uni-
versity, Oberlin College, several years ago. For quite some time, the pro-
ceedings of the conference had languished on the desks of various would-be 
editors —and they had spent quite some time in the filing cabinets of the 
present ones also. In the meantime some of the papers were revised and 
updated by their authors, a fact which prodded the editors of this volume 
to resuscitate the project and resume —or begin as the case might be —the 
work of editing. Some of the papers given at the original Jaszi memorial 
conference were not included in this collection, either because their authors 
had not been able (or willing) to update them, or because turning them into 
publishable prose would have taken more time than the editors felt they 
could afford. These decisions were arbitrary and had been taken without 
the type of consultation that our journal and its camp of contributors and 
advisors had been accustomed to in earlier years. 
The first paper in the collection is an overview by Peter Hanak, Jaszi 's bi-
ographer and the doyen of Hungarian historians of the turn-of-the-century. 
It deals mainly with the subject Jaszi will probably be most remembered for 
in the third millennium: the question of Danubian patriotism. The next es-
say, written by Hungarian historian Attila Pok, explores the quite neglected 
subject (at least as far as historical literature in English is concerned) of 
Jaszi the political tactician and organizational leader of Hungary 's reform 
movement. The following paper, by Canadian historian Thomas Spira, of-
fers a case study of Jaszi 's dealings with Hungary 's minorities during his 
brief 1918 tenure in office as Minister of Nationality Affairs. Next, Gyorgy 
Litvan, another long-time Hungarian student of Oscar Jaszi's life and writ-
ings, outlines the exiled Jaszi 's efforts during the early 1920s to build 
contacts with the progressive statesmen of the Successor States. Then, in 
the penultimate paper in the collection, American historian Thomas Szen-
drey deals with another non-chronological theme: Jaszi's philosophy of 
history. The concluding essay examines a less prominent phase of Jaszi's 
life. It treats some of his activities during the Second World War and 
sketches his reflections on the "Hungarian Problem" some quarter century 
after he had disappeared from the main stage of Hungarian history. This 
study paints a less flattering image of Jaszi —in this case Jaszi the isolated 
and disappointed emigre academic —than that presented by those who deal 
with his career in his younger days. However, rather than intending to 
rain on the Jaszi enthusiasts' parade, this essay wishes to remind readers 
that Jaszi too, had his weaknesses —especially as he was approaching old 
age —and that he is a controversial figure in Hungary 's evolution. 
By publishing this collection of papers, we not only wish to honour 
Jaszi's memory but hope to rekindle interest in a man who was an outspoken 
critic of the Hungary of his day, and who dedicated his life to changing 
the social and political system of his native land, and indeed, the fate 
of all of East Central Europe. Now that the centenary of Jaszi 's debut 
on the Danubian political stage is slowly approaching, we hope that a 
new assessment of his l ife 's work might be possible, one which is not 
coloured by the ideologies —and the ideologically induced emotions —that 
had prevailed in Hungary in the more than three-quarters century since he 
had fled his homeland. 
N.F. Dreisziger 
NOTES 
1 Lee Congdon, "History and Politics in Hungary: The Rehabilitation of Oszkar 
Jaszi," East European Quarterly IX (Fall, 1975), pp. 319f. 
2 Ibid., pp. 320-23. 
3 Historian Jozsef Varga cited ibid., p. 324. 
4 Passages that revealed Jaszi as an anti-communist, were simply left out of a 
published collection of his writings. Tibor Hajdu to the writer of these lines, in 
a private discussion in October, 1983, Bellagio, Italy. 

Oscar Jaszi's Danubian Patriotism 
Peter Hanak 
Oscar Jaszi 's career spans three countries and three epochs —with two in-
terludes in between. Though his relentless search for truth embraces a large 
segment of time, his actual impact on history was limited. Even posterity 
has failed to do justice to his life and ideas. 
Jaszi was —it can be seen clearer and clearer —a scholar, strongly com-
mitted to public life; as well as a politician, deeply committed to scholarship 
and ethical norms. Our century gave him few chances to fulfill this dou-
ble role. He was an expert on minority problems in East Central Europe, 
and became an ardent advocate of a new type of regional — Danubian — 
patriotism. During the last 80 years, however, East Central European reality 
has been reluctant to confirm the validity of his rational vision. 
To start with, we have to ask: how did Jaszi recognize the importance 
of the nationality problem? How could he realize the inter-relatedness of 
the issues of Hungarian national existence and the minority question in 
Hungary? How and why did he arrive at the idea of a common Danubian 
patriotism? The answer seems to be obvious. Jaszi 's homeland, Szatmar 
County, had been the land of the Rakoczis and the Karolyis for centuries. 
It was the land of the Hungarian struggle for freedom from Habsburg rule. 
Furthermore, it was a frontier region, a place where various ethnic and 
religious groups co-existed and, sometimes, clashed with each other. It 
seems evident that, from infancy, he had imbibed an understanding of 
minority problems. This answer is, however, suspiciously easy. As a 
matter of fact, in his youth, Jaszi was more interested in social problems 
than in nationality issues. He was almost thirty when he realized the close 
connection between social and nationality problems. 
"1 was the first in Hungary to [elucidate] the relationship between the na-
tional state and socialism, and to prove that socialism will not result in the 
annihilation of patriotism" he claimed in 1906. Contemporary socialists — 
even Jaszi 's best friend Ervin Szabo, the scholar—rejected the "nationaliza-
tion" of socialism. Jaszi himself soon realized that in backward and agrarian 
Eastern Europe, socialism was a remote Utopia, and that the first require-
ment was to free the bourgeoisie from the influence of aristocratic nation-
alism, and to free the peasantry from the economic remnants of feudalism.1 
Jaszi was rightly proud of being the first —together with his friend and 
companion-in-arms, Endre Ady —to link the programme for social develop-
ment with the need for a new patriotism based on democracy. He realized 
that democracy would be unable to work unless it accommodated patrio-
tism, and it was only through democracy that the nationalism of the Hun-
garian aristocracy and gentry could be cleansed of its feudal stains. Jaszi 
did not exclude from his reform programme Hungary's traditional left-wing 
national opposition either. He believed that he could find in this group the 
"missing link" which would connect the old Hungary of the kuruc freedom 
fighters with the reformed, democratic Hungary of the future. 
Those progressive elements of the opposition who remained faithful to 
the ideas of 1848 might have accepted Jaszi 's programme of democratic 
reform had Jaszi not wanted to extend democracy to Hungary's minorities. 
"One cannot make democracy on a fifty percent basis" —he used to say. 
As long as the minorities do not possess equal rights, as long as they do 
not have autonomous administrative and cultural rights, it will always be 
easy to turn them against any Hungarian effort for democracy, as had been 
the case, with tragic consequences, in 1848. 
Jaszi ' s argumentation was primarily political: it was seemingly based on 
tactical exigencies of Hungarian national politics. His everyday experiences 
as well as his investigations of the nature of nationalism convinced him 
that there were no substantial differences between the Hungarian national 
idea and that of the minorities: they were all manifestations of one and the 
same cultural process of human evolution. The minorities had the same 
right to national existence as Magyars had, all these movements had the 
same purpose: national autonomy and self-determination/ 
Before World War I, Jaszi dedicated himself for years to the study of his-
tory and sociology. The result of successful reconciliation of the scholar 
and the politician was his famous 1912 book: The Formation of Nation 
States and the Minority Question.3 In this work he pointed out that the 
national movements were powerful enough to create nation-states and, in 
the process, disrupt artificially created, dynastic empires. This was a law 
of nature which manifested itself in the process of national development. 
Therefore, all the endeavors which tended towards the unfolding national 
cultures are "not immature chauvinism . . . but a vital force without which 
people cannot survive." This was Jaszi 's conclusion in terms of his posi-
tivist philosophy. 
Jaszi saw the advancement of mankind as a gradually unfolding pro-
cess. One cannot begin the unification of mankind with internationalism, 
he used to say. "Mankind has been created in a manner that the road to 
internationalism leads through the national path, and to this through the 
vernacular of masses." From this basic thesis follows that national minori-
ties can be involved in a higher level of culture only through their mother 
tongue. Any kind of forced assimilation can only impede the desirable 
process of regional and continental integration. Hungary can get rid of 
domination by the Austrian bureaucracy and military only through just and 
fair minority legislation. "Therefore I state that the minority question is 
the Archimedean point of Hungarian democracy."4 
Initially, a radical federalist plan for the reorganization of Hungary did 
not arise from this premise. All Jaszi demanded for the country's minorities 
was fair administration and jurisdiction, as well as good education, all 
offered in the language of the nationalities. He did not mention any kind 
of federation involving the peoples of Hungary before the war, on the 
contrary, he wanted to maintain the territorial and political integrity of 
Greater Hungary tout a prix. In this sense he was unable to break out from 
the magic spell of Hungarian nationalism. But in pre-war Hungary there 
was no person among the Magyars who went—or could go —further than 
Jaszi, nor did the demands of the national minorities exceed these requisites. 
The relevant point in Jaszi's activities was not so much the actual formula 
of any programme of transition, but the new orientation. Jaszi discovered 
and propagated a new alternative to the nationalist tradition prevailing in 
Hungary at that time.5 
During the First World War, Jaszi's political outlook radically changed. 
As a devoted believer of progress, he discovered some kind of "histori-
cal purpose, divine will" even behind the shocking absurdity of the war. 
Mankind, he believed, was marching toward a higher level of integration 
and civilization. He was worried that this progress would be hindered as a 
result of invasion of East Central Europe by tsarist Russia, or through the 
penetration of the region by Pan-Slavism. As a result, he became attracted 
to the German Mitteleuropa project—for a while. Immediately after the 
February Revolution of 1917 in Russia, however, he changed his opinion. 
"After the overthrow of Russian tsarism it is no longer a Utopia to co-
ordinate the entire territory of European culture in a united international 
organization," he wrote in 1918.6 
Such an organization or a narrower Danubian Union was, however, po-
litically unfeasible. We may ask what consideration induced him to accept 
the idea of such confederation? Did it not stand in sharp contradiction with 
the basic thesis of his book of 1912, which had regarded the formation of 
the nation and nation-states almost a law of nature? 
Although Jaszi discovered and acknowledged the historical inevitability 
of the formation of nations, he never glorified the idea of small states, 
which he called Kleinstaaterei. Particularly not in East Central Europe, 
under shadow of two colossal big powers. He knew very well —as did 
all serious thinkers and politicians in the Danube region: Palacky, Bal-
cescu, Eotvos, or Masaryk —that in this multicultural part of Europe the 
existence of homogeneous nation-states was simply impossible. Even the 
smallest state would be mixed ethnically and all these internally divided 
states would be rather weak in themselves. As a matter of fact, the concept 
of the Kleinstaaterei had always been —and would always be — responsible 
for their dependence on one or the other of the neighbouring great powers. 
This situation was one reason why Jaszi offered, in 1918, a third alterna-
tive. If under the given circumstances it would be impossible to maintain 
the supranational monarchy on the one hand, and if its splintering into 
small states would be undesirable or fatal for the nations of the region on 
the other, the only acceptable solution would be confederation. Only this 
could comply with the divergent historical tendencies making for national 
independence as well as supranational integration. Only this could fulfill 
the historical task of establishing the cooperation "of peoples who, left 
alone, would be unable to stand up to the double squeeze of the Germans 
and the East Slavs."7 
There were other motives behind Jaszi's great plan, too. One can take it 
for granted that his arguments were influenced by his national sentiments 
even in 1918, in the midst of national and Central European catastrophy. 
At the same time, his negotiations with the leaders of Hungary 's ethnic 
minorities show that he regarded his plan as a basis for discussion, and he 
was ready to make compromises. He wanted, he wrote later, "to work for 
anticipating the future" [elebe dolgozni a jovonek]. 
History has buried Jaszi's still-born project for a Danubian Confedera-
tion. In the post-World War I years of desperation, Jaszi could do nothing 
but concentrate on two struggles: a war of words against the counterrevo-
lution in Hungary, and a campaign for a democratic minority policy toward 
Hungarian minorities in the Successor States. Concerning the latter, he had 
hopes in the new regimes, particularly that of Czechoslovakia. At the time, 
his hopes did not seem totally unrealistic, only afterwards did they prove 
illusory. In spite of these hope-driven illusions, Jaszi soberly warned of 
the dangers inherent in the post-war reorganization in East Central Europe. 
As early as 1920, he returned to the idea of the confederation. In the 
Becsi Magyar Ujsag (the Hungarian Newspaper of Vienna), he argued that 
the problems of Central Europe could be solved only by the establishment 
of a Danubian Confederation, and that only such a confederated Central 
Europe could rescue Europe from economic decay and endless power con-
flicts. The crisis is general, he wrote in the 1921 Christmas issue of the 
newspaper, but its nest—the sedes mali — reside in the Danubian Basin. The 
problem was Janus-like. While in the old Monarchy there was economic 
unity and free inter-regional trade, the dynastic supranational state impeded 
the free national development of the region's ethnic groups. In the succes-
sor states, however, national sovereignty was realized but economic unity 
had been shattered. Neither the old regime nor the new post-war system was 
conducive to Danubian co-existence. "The great problem of the Danubian 
people is that they ought to reconcile the uncurtailed national independence 
with the economic and cultural interests of the common Danubian fate." 
They had to give up economic autarchy in order to preserve their politi-
cal and territorial sovereignty: "this is the way which leads the Danubian 
people from disorder and disintegration to organization and liberty."8 
Historical and political considerations lead Jaszi to the conclusion that 
little states were obsolete. He wondered whether the renewal of a set of 
little states could be lasting or would be a transitional and anachronis-
tic phenomenon in a world of "mammoth-states." The only solution was 
integration and federation. But neither the pre-national dynastic "supra-
nationalism," nor the post-national socialist internationalism could provide 
the form and the ideological basis for a new multinational federation. The 
feasible way was nothing else but a rational and fair compromise between 
the Danubian nation-states and their nationalisms. And here Jaszi arrived 
at an essential discovery: no awareness of common interests or a common 
fate —a Danubian consciousness— existed in the region. Or, at least, only 
a very weak one could be found among a handful of educated intellectu-
als. In the Habsburg Monarchy— Jaszi wrote in his pioneering book on 
the Habsburg Empire 's dissolution —"all the nations lived as moral and 
intellectual strangers to one another. Both the dynastic epic in Austria and 
the feudal [one] in Hungary were incapable of creating a sufficiently strong 
and cohesive state idea. What really did fail was a general civic education 
based on a common civic ethos." Consequently, the first step toward the 
Danubian Confederation should be the fostering of a regional community 
consciousness: a Danubian Patriotism. 
From the 1920s on, Jaszi was a Danubian patriot first. He never ceased 
to explain and interpret the new form of regional patriotism. He always 
argued the compatibility of democracy and nationalism in a multinational 
region, and to proclaim the advantages of a confederation held together by 
the force of humanism and rationalism. 
Jaszi 's conception was based on the rational assumption that freedom 
and democracy can create and satisfy the need of the community, (i.e. the 
national community) for self-realization. Democracy and national existence 
are, however, two different forms of organized human existence. Although 
compatible, they can not replace each other. Thus the question arises as to 
whether the voluntary union of the Danubian peoples can ever be attained 
through democratic means. Prior to the breaking up of the Monarchy, the 
Hungarians had closed their minds to any internal national autonomy for 
the nationalities. After the Treaty of Trianon, the Hungarian Left would 
have been satisfied even with territorial revisions based on ethnic consider-
ations, but by then the leaders of the successor states would not accept this 
compromise. What power could have created and held together a confed-
eration of this "Babel" of nations? Reason and understanding and equity? 
Or the will of the great powers? A centralized dictatorship? History seems 
to suggest that the dictatorial method could establish a Danubian confed-
eration, but this would not be beneficial, while the democratic approach, 
although beneficial, seems hardly feasible. 
In the course of time, Jaszi also recognized that, in addition to the ex-
isting international order and irreconcilable nationalism, there were other 
inherent obstacles and contradictions in the path of a democratic Danubian 
confederation. Still, he faithfully adhered to this idea up to the end of his 
life. The gap between political realities and his rational prophecy, was so 
enormous that in his last writings even he admitted that Danubian peace, 
democracy and patriotism did not live but in dreams.9 
Presumably all men of Realpolitik and all serious political scientists are of 
the same opinion. But the historian cannot safely say that the only reality 
to be coped with is what has been realized or can possibly be realized. 
Instead, he feels sympathy for Jaszi's last sentence on this point: "there 
are dreams which are stranger and more realistic than any petty games and 
scrambles of everyday politics." 
EDITORS' NOTES 
1 For more details on this subject, see Peter Hanak, Jaszi Oszkdr dunai patriotiz-
musa [The Danubian Patriotism of Oscar Jaszi] (Budapest: Magveto Konyvkiado, 
1985), especially pp. 34f. For a succinct overview of the topic see Peter Hanak, 
"A dunataji kozossegtudat ebresztese" [The Awakening of a Common Danubian 
Awareness] Miihely [Workshop], VII, 3 (1981) 4—20. For Hanak's sources see 
the endnotes to his book, pp. 161-79, and those of his article, pp. 19-20. 
2 Hanak, Jdszi Oszkdr dunai patriotizmusa, pp. 39-46. 
3 Oszkar Jaszi, A nemzeti allamok kialakulasa es a nemzetisegi kerdes (Budapest, 
1912); a more recent (partial) edition, edited and introduced by Gyorgy Litvan, 
appeared in 1986 (Budapest, Gondolat). 
4 For a more detailed discussion of Jaszi's book, see Hanak, Jdszi Oszkdr dunai 
patriotizmusa pp. 47-55, as well as Litvan's introduction to Jaszi's book (see 
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Jaszi as the Organizational Leader 
of a Reform Movement 
Att i la Pok 
Judging merely by the method of counting the number of times Oscar 
Jaszi ' s name occurs in certain Hungarian books, one can draw conclusions 
about his historical significance: he is among the key figures in the Hungary 
of the early twentieth century. Volume 7 of the 10-volume History of 
Hungary1 contains more references only to Gyula Andrassy Jr., Albert 
Apponyi, Dezso Banffy, Gyula Justh, Ferenc Kossuth, and of course Francis 
Joseph and Prime Minister Istvan Tisza; about the same number to Endre 
Ady or Mihaly Karolyi; and fewer to the Habsburg dynasty in general, 
to leading Social Democrats, Francis Ferdinand, and countless others. In 
the 4-volume Chronology of Hungarian History2 Jaszi rates a creditable, 
middle-ranking ten mentions in a work that spans the whole of Hungarian 
history. 
How did this son of a country doctor come to play so central a role on 
the crowded stage of Hungarian history between 1900 and 1918? 
The Periodical Huszadik Szazad and the Society of Social Sciences 
The story begins in the 1880s, in the law faculty of Budapest 's Peter 
Pazmany University of Sciences, and in one or two of the city's salons. 
Here a circle of friends formed. Jews, Catholics and Protestants from noble, 
gentry, and bourgeois families alike were among them, but the commonest 
type had a middle-class or petty-bourgeois background, hailed from areas 
of Transylvania and Upper Hungary with their sizable minority popula-
tions, and had exchanged their native land for the capital. In Budapest, 
members of this group became disillusioned by the emptiness of the patri-
otic sloganeering that permeated political and social life. They loathed the 
tub-thumping nationalism of the day mainly for its intellectual poverty.3 
For the time being, however, they by no means offered a social, national 
or minority reform programme of their own. At first their main demand 
w a s that social problems should be approached scientifically. Accordingly, 
the group sought to provide a forum for the scientific analysis of society, 
and succeeded in doing so in the shape of the periodical Huszadik Szazad 
(Twentieth Century), the first, and perhaps the most lasting tribute to Jaszi 's 
talent as an organizer. From the publication's very inception, Jaszi appears 
to be the ablest editor on the staff who was capable, through the force of 
his arguments and personality, of asserting his views in the debates that 
arose. 
Of debates, there were plenty. The reason for this was that the people 
that gathered around the Huszadik Szazad were extremely heterogeneous 
in political outlook. The group, under Jaszi's intellectual and practical 
guidance, considered it vital to examine the general laws governing social 
development in order to arrive at effective solutions to day-to-day issues. 
Jasz i ' s own theoretical investigations by 1904-05 had led him to conclude 
that however day-to-day politics might develop, the future would belong 
to socialism. The path to this would be through general social reform, 
through the cleansing of Hungary of the nobles' nationalism. The feudal 
elements in the country's economy, politics and social affairs would be 
eliminated through a new kind of socialism, one that eschewed the idea of 
class struggle but respected patriotism and favoured the unity of mankind.4 
Apart from the columns of the Huszadik Szazad, which served as a fo-
rum for such ideas, and for the debates surrounding them, there was the 
Tarsadalomtudomdnyi Tarsasag (the Society of Social Sciences) formed 
in 1901. Jaszi cannot be credited with founding it, but he soon became 
involved in choosing the themes for the Society's debates, as well as the 
people to be invited for lectures. 
Suffrage and Socialism 
Like many members of his generation, Jaszi saw a need, and a realistic 
chance for, urgent political action, especially during the crisis of 1905-06, 
which turned political life in Hungary on its head. Having considered the 
political front-lines —on the one hand the nationalist nobility demanding 
constitutional change, and, on the other, reformers calling for an expanded 
franchise and effective social policy— Jaszi's decision was clear: if the 
Imperial Court in Vienna stood for the latter, it had to be supported. On 
returning from an extended research and study trip to Paris, he began work-
ing towards organizing the League for Universal Suffrage by Secret Ballot. 
On August 26, 1905, a joint declaration was issued by four organizations 
of reformers, including the Huszadik Szazad and the Society of Social Sci-
ences. The emphasis was placed on the potential of the suffrage issue to 
unite the nation. Universal suffrage by secret ballot was declared a sine 
qua non "for our national liberty and material and intellectual prosperity."5 
However, it soon became evident that under the prevailing political cir-
cumstances the struggle for suffrage could not, after all, be elevated above 
the level of day-to-day politics. As soon as September 20, Jaszi had to 
admit to a friend of his that the League would collapse and that, in the 
future, the reformers would have to change their tactics.6 The new tactics 
required new organizations and forums. Accordingly, in the same year 
Jaszi helped to establish the Tarsadalomtudomanyi Szabadiskola (Socio-
logical Free School). 
Jaszi outlined the reformers ' objectives in 1907 in his work Az uj Ma-
gyarorszdg fele (Towards a New Hungary). The traditional political slogans 
of 1848 and 1867, he argued, no longer provided realistic political plat-
forms. The only way to true independence for Hungary was through land 
reforms, progressive taxation, universal suffrage by secret ballot, freedom 
of assembly and the press, the guarantees of minority rights, the aboli-
tion of latifundia, and the secularization of church property. From such 
changes, Jaszi believed, constitutional and military independence would 
-j 
follow automatically. 
The Independence Party 
In rethinking the concept of independence and relating his theoretical no-
tions to daily politics, Jaszi arrived inevitably at the problem of clarifying 
the relations between the radical movement and the Independence Party. He 
pointed out in an article in 1910 that the "Independentist," or kuruc [kuruc 
refers to the anti-Habsburg freedom fighters of early modern Hungary —ed.] 
policy had, historically, "taken two directions. One was a wholly consti-
tutional policy of protest against the infringement of constitutional rights, 
representing the interests of the armed nobility. The other supported the in-
terests of those whom the nobility had harmed . . . and thus was democratic 
and social . . . The Independence Party had inherited both policy currents 
from the by-gone era of the kuruc."8 In another article Jaszi called this 
party "the missing link between kuruc Hungary and modern Hungary."9 
Jaszi was working towards long-term cooperation with the Independence 
Party people who were inclined towards democratic reforms within the 
framework of organizing all political forces willing to stand up for universal 
suffrage. The publication of an "open letter" by Hungarian intellectuals 
to Istvan Tisza, demanding democratic suffrage,1 0 the foundation of the 
Suffrage League and the Reform Club in 1910, were important milestones 
of this work. A new, still more important forum for Jaszi 's ideas would 
be the establishment, at the end March 1910, of the daily newspaper, the 
Vildg (World).11 
Freemasonry 
The paper was launched by Hungarian freemasons as a forum for "ex-
t reme liberalism." Jaszi was not its founder, but was largely responsible 
for the internal stirrings among the 67 lodges (with 6,000-7,000 active 
members) that operated in Hungary at the time. Jaszi believed that the 
freemasons, who in principle eschewed day-to-day politics, could establish 
a liberal or, more precisely, a freethinking daily paper that proclaimed radi-
cal principles.12 As early as September, 1905, Jaszi had remarked in a letter 
to a friend that Hungarian freemasonry, influential in so many ways, might 
c o m e to serve the ideas he was forming: "freemasonry can only regain its 
old shine if it considers the cause of the working-class struggle for liberty 
as its own, as it once did the cause of the bourgeoisie . . . Those familiar 
with the situation believe that by displaying appropriate determination we 
could soon gain a dominant role and deploy a vast organization behind 
us ." 1 3 
The plan was put into practice; in 1906 Jaszi and a few of his followers 
jo ined the Democracy Lodge, with the momentary aim of gaining finan-
cial support for the establishment of the Sociological Free School. But the 
group, which urged political, scientific and cultural action, had difficulty 
adjusting to the lodge. Shortly afterwards they were to be found in another 
lodge, this one named after Martinovics,14 in which the foremost progres-
sive figures of the day soon gathered. In most cases it was Jaszi and his 
f r iends who organized activities aimed at bringing freemasonry and the cir-
cle around the Society of Social Sciences and the Huszadik Szazad closer 
together. These activities took the form of debates on fundamental issues 
such as the agrarian question, clericalism, or the minority problem. Jaszi 
and his friends, and their new-found freemason allies also helped to bring 
into being the Galilei Kor (Galileo Circle), an association of freethinking, 
socially and progressively-minded students. 
Other partners and allies 
One of Jaszi's greatest enterprises of the time was the preparation (from 
about 1906 until its publication in early 1912) of his book on nationalism, 
the rise of nation states, and the nationality problem.15 In the course of col-
lecting material for this book, he made much use of his contacts with some 
leading personalities of Hungary's nationalities. Some of these contacts 
had been established while Jaszi had been looking for allies in the struggle 
for universal suffrage. Not only did Jaszi correspond and maintain good 
personal relationship with these people, but he also helped to publish the 
articles of minority writers in progressive journals, reviewed their works, 
contributed to their press, and visited the regions inhabited by nationalities. 
We know best his relations with Slovak1 6 and Rumanian1 7 politicians, writ-
ers, journalists (e.g. M. Hodza, A. Stefanik, and E. Isac) but some of his 
correspondence with Serb and Croatian intellectuals has also survived.18 
During this period Jaszi was doing his best to make representatives of the 
nationalities allies in the struggle for a truly democratic Hungary. In spite 
of numerous conflicts, and the final outcome, I don' t think the daily Vildg 
was exaggerating in the middle of October, 1918, when it proclaimed that 
Jaszi was the "Hungarian to be trusted by Rumanians, Slovaks, as well as 
by South Slavs and Czechs. . . " 1 9 
Jaszi 's book, his most important scholarly output of this pre-1918 period, 
was most enthusiastically received by Endre Ady, the great Hungarian poet 
of the age. There had been a long-standing mutual respect and friendship 
between the two for some time. Jaszi was a devoted admirer of Ady ' s 
poetry. He considered Ady to be the poet of the Hungarian renewal. Ady, 
the regular reader of Huszadik Szazad, had always carefully followed Jaszi 's 
activity and defended the radicals in the press against conservative attacks.20 
For Ady, Jaszi 's book was the greatest, most daring and most Hungarian 
deed of the decade. According to Ady, Jaszi gave new content to the 
corrupted concept of Hungarian liberty by working out a well-grounded, 
long-term project for the transformation of the country. . . his stream 
assumed riverlike width," wrote Ady about his friend, "the other tiny little 
blind paths of honest Hungarian intellectuals. . . , now flowed towards 
21 • him, towards a happy communion. . . " Jaszi 's great significance is that 
he offered a way worth following in a country which seemed to lack any 
possible way out of its desperate situation. Though, of course, Jaszi cannot 
be credited with being the organizer of the Hungarian literary renewal, when 
surveying his organizational activity, we have to keep in mind that modern 
literature (and of course the new painting and music as well) were Jaszi 's 
natural allies in the struggle for a thoroughgoing renewal of Hungarian 
society, politics and culture. As Jaszi put in an article on Ady in 1914: 
"Both Petofi and Ady are unique among poets of their times: they make 
the gravest social issues relevant in a most passionate way. They offer 
programs . . . becoming orators or politicians."22 Ady reciprocated the 
compliment in a speech —made in June, 1914, at one of the founding 
rallies of the Bourgeois Radical Party —by calling Jaszi "his leader." 
The Bourgeois Radical Party 
The debates that paved the way for this party's establishment took place 
in the Martinovics Freemasons' Lodge. In these debates, during the final 
months of 1913, Jaszi argued for the creation of a party. He pointed out 
that —because the slogans of 1848 and 1867 had been thoroughly compro-
mised, and were shorn of their credibility— there was good chance for the 
creation of a party structure that would reflect the actual interests of society. 
Jaszi 's arguments came in for plenty of criticism.23 His critics doubted that 
the small Hungarian middle class could be organized to champion bour-
geois interests in a consistent fashion. They also questioned the likelihood 
of a bourgeois party ever enlisting the support of the peasant masses. At 
most, they said, one could count on a small group with anticlerical, radical 
opinions. 
These doubts were not unfounded. Although the new party soon attracted 
the most prominent personalities of the bourgeoisie and of the intelligentsia, 
it never developed into broad political movement. The decisive obstacle, 
undoubtedly, was the war, yet one cannot duck the question: Did the 
establishment of the Radical Party strengthen or weaken cohesion among 
progressives? Was Jaszi right in 1914, or was he right in 1938 when he 
described the founding of the party as the biggest blunder of his life? For 
the party was rebuffed in almost every quarter, including Jaszi 's comrades-
in-arms in the struggle for universal suffrage. With hindsight one can 
say it would certainly have been more helpful to the immediate cause of 
electoral reform to have retained the old framework, in view of the fragile 
unity within the progressive camp. Viewed from a historical perspective, 
however, the foundation of the party was a milestone in the democratic 
transformation of public and political life in Hungary. By its very existence 
the party in time would have provided an impetus for the creation of a 
modern party structure able to reflect and express the actual interests of 
Hungarian society. 
The Great War, Mihaly Karolyi 
The use of the conditional tense is appropriate, of course, because before the 
party could begin functioning the war broke out. Even before hostilities 
had started, Jaszi wrote that resolving the South Slav question through 
war could only infect fatally the wounds that the Monarchy had already 
received: "The call that should be trumpeted with renewed force from 
the tragic bier of the heir apparent [the assassinated Francis Ferdinand] 
is that of universal suffrage and a democratic people's state, not armed 
vengeance."24 But it only became possible for the progressives to organize 
against the war once others had recognized the deadly peril as well. On July 
17, 1916, Mihaly Karolyi founded a new Independence Party with an anti-
German, democratic platform that included support for universal suffrage. 
By this time Jaszi had started to distance himself from the Naumann plan for 
Central European integration under German influence. Although Karolyi's 
paper chose precisely this juncture to accuse him of unbridled chauvinism, 
Jaszi 's article in reply called, in fact, for alliance: "Honourable pacifism 
has two other pillars apart f rom general democracy: the first is national 
freedom, and the second commercial freedom. Mihaly Karolyi must finally 
become clear on these matters if he desires a fruitful working atmosphere 
for his noble endeavors . . . But this requires, above all, a strict stock-taking 
of his principles and friends."2 5 Shortly afterwards, Jaszi sent Karolyi a 
copy of his 1912 book: A nemzeti allamok kialakulasa es a nemzetisegi 
kerdes (The formation of the Nation States and the Minority Question). 
This great theoretical work played a part in transforming Karolyi's political 
views. Jaszi himself was astonished to learn —at the pacifist congress in 
Berne at the end of 1917 —that Karolyi, when asked by a British politician 
how he thought the peoples of the Danube and the Balkans might live 
together in the future, expressed his support for a federal solution. 
From 1917 onwards, significant cooperation developed among Jaszi 's 
radicals, the Social Democrats, members of Karolyi 's party, and other left-
wing forces. There is more than symbolic significance in the fact that Jaszi, 
who had done such manifold theoretical and practical work to bring the 
various strands of progressive Hungarian thinking together, drafted the pro-
gramme for the National Council — the common organization of the Social 
Democratic, Independence and Bourgeois Radical Parties —on October 25, 
1918, opening a new, albeit short chapter in Hungarian history.26 
I have considered Jaszi's organizational activity in the Hungarian pro-
gressive movement up until October, 1918. This was not a movement 
that slowly spread or steadily gained greater influence, but it undertook a 
series of greater or lesser, more-or-less successful actions. Jaszi 's great-
ness as an organizer lay precisely in his ability to adapt the concept of a 
national democratic state —which he had carefully matured in theory —to 
prevailing circumstances. He was also able to recognize opportunities for 
potential alliances, and to put them to use when it was possible. He was 
not a political manager eager to score day-to-day successes, but was one 
who matched the rational, ethical content of his political concepts with an 
equally rational and ethical search for a way to realize them. His rational 
expectations were often belied by history, but through his great abilities 
and energy as an organizer, his reputation as a scholar and, last but not by 
any means least, his mora! integrity, he became the central figure of the 
Hungarian progressive camp. Most of the achievements of the Hungarian 
progressive movement in the early part of this century were in some way 
connected to his name. 
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The Reaction of Hungary's German Minorities to 
Oscar Jaszi's Plan for an "Eastern Switzerland"* 
Thomas Spira 
On October 26, 1918, the newly-formed Hungarian National Council re-
placed the defunct royal government and soon proclaimed its programme 
for a reconstituted Hungary. This seven-point directive was the work of 
Oscar (Oszkar) Jaszi, leader of the Radical Bourgeois Party, and soon to 
be minister of nationalities in the Hungarian "People's Republic" under the 
presidency of Count Mihaly Karolyi, wartime leader of the radical section 
of the pacifist Independence Party.1 The Karolyi government was aware 
of Hungary 's precarious situation after the defeat of the Central Powers. 
The Austro-Hungarian dualist partnership was dead. Czechoslovakia, Ru-
mania, and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (the future 
Yugoslavia), the new and enlarged states that materialized from the ruins 
of the Habsburg Monarchy, had detached the bulk of Hungary 's non-Ma-
gyar inhabitants even before the fighting had stopped. Karolyi and Jaszi 
hoped that it might still be possible to recover some of these territorial and 
human losses before the impending peace treaties ratified this situation. 
The two statesmen proposed to transform the hitherto Magyar-dominated 
Hungarian state into a voluntary federation consisting of autonomous na-
tionalities governed by liberal principles —an East Central European replica 
of the Swiss Confederation — or a virtual "Eastern Switzerland."2 This plan 
was in harmony with Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, a peace proposal 
that the American president presented to the joint session of the two Houses 
of Congress on January 8, 1918. Point 10 stipulated that "The peoples of 
Austria-Hungary . . . be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous 
development."3 Jaszi agreed that the destiny of Hungary's non-Magyar na-
tionalities "had to be settled on the basis of the Wilson Principles."4 This 
paper investigates why Hungary's German-speaking people, often referred 
to as Swabians, refused to accept the Karolyi regime's far-reaching cultural 
and administrative autonomy offers, or, as Jaszi expressed it, to accept an 
"endeavor to democratize Hungary and to remold the old feudal state into a 
confederation of free nations."5 The Germans ' reluctance to cooperate with 
Karolyi 's government may be ascribed to the socialist tinge of the new 
regime, the social, religious and political arch-conservatism of the predom-
inantly rural Swabians, and Hungary's Magyar-oriented minority policies 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
In 1910, Hungary 's German-speaking citizens totaled about 2,037,000 
out of the country 's population of nearly 21 million.6 The mainly Protes-
tant Transylvanian Germans (Saxons) numbered about 234,000; the largely 
Roman Catholic Swabians numbered about 1,667,000.7 By the early 20th 
century the Saxons had become urbanized, politicized, and many were 
well-educated. Most Swabians, however, clung to their ancestral German 
peasant culture. Swabian majorities lived in 330 small villages and a few 
towns scattered throughout Hungary. Many communities were clustered in 
strategically insecure areas: in West Hungary adjoining Austria, surround-
ing Budapest, and next to the Serbian (later Yugoslav) frontier.8 While 
Hungary was part of the powerful Dual Monarchy, the Germans' distri-
bution pattern did not matter. But when Hungary became a small and 
vulnerable independent state after World War I, the presence of these en-
claves in sensitive regions became a source of concern and set the tone for 
a cautious Hungarian minority policy. 
At first, Hungary treated the non-Magyars evenhandedly. The 1867 
Compromise had granted the country equal partnership in the Austro-
Hungarian dual monarchy, and for the first time since the Middle Ages, 
the Magyars could formulate domestic policy without interference from 
Vienna. The Nationality Law of 1868 was a liberal document that granted 
Hungary 's non-Magyar citizens the right to establish elementary and middle 
schools in their mother tongue, permitted a limited number of ethnic higher 
institutions, national churches, use of the vernacular in rural administration 
and opportunities for non-Magyar cultural development.9 However, these 
benevolent measures failed to stand the test of time. In the fifty years pre-
ceding World War I, the Magyar public and the governments grew increas-
ingly more nationalistic, partially in response to the rising consciousness of 
Hungary 's non-Magyars. During these decades, Hungary's minorities, es-
pecially the Swabians, lost most of their indigenous cultural facilities.10 By 
war ' s end in 1918, the formerly well-organized German-language village 
school system had virtually ceased to exist. 
The rural Swabians' ultra-conservative culture centered around churches 
and clerically-dominated elementary village schools. The Swabian literacy 
rate of 82 percent was the highest in Hungary,1 1 yet few of these Swabian 
villagers desired to expose their children to higher education or embark 
them on professional careers in Hungary's Magyar urban centers. They 
distrusted and disliked such "progressives" as liberals, socialists and com-
munists, and particularly Jews. Before World War I, the Swabians were the 
only non-politicized ethnic group in Hungary, with the possible exception 
of the Ruthenes. They voted for Magyar or Magyarized conservatively-
minded Christians to represent them in the Hungarian Parliament. They 
did, however, acquire a self-appointed informal leader in the person of 
Dr. Jakob Bleyer, professor of philology at the University of Budapest. 
Bleyer's humble peasant origins in the Bacska region of southern Hungary 
and ultraconservative Roman Catholic credentials gained the confidence 
and support of the Swabian peasantry. 
Bleyer preached a simple homily of German cultural nationalism, dy-
nastic Habsburg loyalism and traditional Hungarian patriotism. Bleyer and 
his Swabian supporters saw no contradiction between simultaneous devo-
tion to the German cultural Nation (the Habsburg Emperor-King was a 
German) and loyalty to the Hungarian fatherland representing the political 
state. Bleyer explained these complex issues in terms the average Swabian 
villager could easily comprehend. The Hungarian state, he wrote during 
World War I, had every right to assimilate the ethnic intelligentsias into the 
Magyar lingual and cultural stream, provided the government preserved the 
sanctity and high quality of the German-language rural school system. In 
the urban centers, however, the fusion of the ethnic intelligentsia into the 
Magyar ethos was inevitable. Particularly for this reason German culture 
had to remain pure in the Swabian rural environment. To Bleyer, seces-
sion from the Hungarian fatherland or autonomy on the basis of ethnic 
peculiarities was tantamount to treason. He maintained these views firmly 
throughout the brief postwar period leading to the 28 June 1919 Treaty of 
Trianon.12 By then, nearly all of Hungary's ethnic minorities, including the 
Saxons of Transylvania, had seceded and joined one or the other of the 
fledgling successor states. 
Since 1908, Jaszi had been considering how to remedy the real or alleged 
injustices the Magyars inflicted on Hungary's non-Magyar minorities. At 
that time, he was still uncertain how exactly to counteract the centrifugal 
forces imperiling polyethnic states. He criticized the Magyar nationalists 
for refusing to grant the non-Magyars a more favourable franchise. It was 
untrue, Jaszi asserted, that if given the opportunity these peoples would 
betray the Hungarian state. Peasants of all nationalities had much more 
in common with each other than Magyar peasants with Magyar officials. 
Jaszi accused the Magyar ruling classes of keeping national animosities 
alive for selfish reasons.13 In a real democracy, he maintained, "the loyalty 
of the ethnic minorities is ensured by letting them have their legal rights 
and permitting them to succeed in their aspirations."14 
Within four years, Jaszi had systematized his thinking on the grievances 
suffered by Hungary 's nationalities. He classed minority violations into 
three principal categories: (1) administrative and judicial grievances; (2) 
economic grievances; and (3) educational and other cultural grievances.15 
Because the heterogeneity of Hungary 's population confounded him, a con-
crete, universal solution still eluded Jaszi. Hungary's nationalities differed 
culturally, historically and numerically. He considered certain improve-
ments mandatory —in Hungary's schools, for example, in the public admin-
istration and in jurisprudence. Moreover, sooner or later the government 
would have to allow the nationalities to use their languages and culture.16 
By 1918, Jaszi 's ideas on how to solve the nationality question had ma-
tured. In March of that year, he wanted to " liberate the nationalities f rom 
the assimilationist drill that is unable to Magyarize effectively but which 
keeps our ethnic fellow citizens in an eternal state of dependency, and 
makes bitter enemies of them."1 7 To remedy these evils involved invok-
ing Point 8 of Jaszi 's National Bourgeois Radical Party programme: "The 
creation of peace with the nationalities, in order to ensure the unity and 
flowering of the Hungarian state. Non-Magyar citizens must have all their 
legal lingual and cultural demands satisfied in the spirit of the Deak and 
Eotvos Nationality laws [of 1868]."18 Jaszi would most likely have agreed 
with Bleyer that adequate minority-language schools formed the bulwark 
of non-Magyar privileges.19 Unlike Bleyer, however, Jaszi wanted to es-
tablish limited minority language instruction in Hungary 's middle schools, 
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academies and universities. 
Near war 's end, Jaszi published his definitive plan for a Danubian con-
federation.21 The new political-economic unit would include the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy in addition to the various Danubian Balkan states. 
Jaszi ' s scheme may be summarized as follows. The dual monarchy would 
be replaced by a pentarchy, a polity consisting of one sovereign Magyar 
state (Hungary); one German state (Austria with its German possessions 
only); and three Slavic states (composed of Czechs, Poles and Illyrians or 
South Slavs). The new commonwealth would have a common defence and 
foreign policy, and a customs union would make it economically viable. 
Each national unit would include minority populations of varying size and 
composition. Most of these ethnic groups would be related to the nationality 
dominating one or more of the states. For practical reasons alone, member 
states would not persecute each others' ethnic minorities, whose rights 
would also be protected by laws and constitutional arrangements. Disputes 
would be adjudicated by an inter-state arbitration board and by a hereditary 
dynastic ruler, presumably a Habsburg.22 
Jaszi 's book did not explain how ethnic autonomy would be practiced 
within each unit. He did, however, criticize Austrian Chancellor Karl Ren-
ner for opposing the division of the Austrian Empire into four autonomous 
units based on their populations' language differences. Jaszi believed that 
autonomy would alleviate minority grievances in the Austrian part of the 
monarchy, whose four major peoples —the Czechs, Poles, Germans and 
South Slavs, had the expertise to establish and maintain viable autonomous 
governments.2 3 Jaszi cited the excellence of Louis Kossuth 's 1860 national-
ity plan formulated in exile for the reconstruction of the Austrian monarchy. 
Although Kossuth's eight-point plan never used the word "autonomy,"2 4 
many of these ideas eventually cropped up in Jaszi's autonomy schemes 
while Jaszi was serving as Karolyi's minister of nationalities. 
Jaszi soon had the opportunity to translate his nationality theories into 
action. On November 16, 1918, the Karolyi regime proclaimed a repub-
lic in Hungary. Jaszi immediately initiated action to prevent or reverse 
the defection of Hungary 's non-Magyar nationalities by offering each of 
them the opportunity to become administratively autonomous units in a 
federated Hungary. He was too late. On October 12, the Rumanian Na-
tional Party, composed of Hungarian-Rumanian politicians, had opted for 
self-determination and forbade Hungary to represent Rumanians at the im-
pending peace conference. By December 1, Hungary's Rumanians for-
mally attached Transylvania and the Banat of Temesvar to the Rumanian 
Kingdom. On October 29, Croatia joined the newly constituted Yugoslav 
National Council and participated in proclaiming Yugoslav independence. 
On October 30, the Slovak National Council unified Slovakia (Felvidek) 
with the Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia. The Ruthenes of Karpatalja 
(Ruthenia) followed suit shortly thereafter.25 On January 2, 1919, the Sax-
ons of Transylvania formally joined their Rumanian fellow citizens in the 
Kingdom of Rumania. The Swabians of southern Hungary (Bacska) put 
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up no resistance when Yugoslavia overran their territories. 
By the end of 1918, the Swabians living in Hungary remained the only 
sizable non-Magyar group to remain loyal to Hungary. Only the approx-
imately 300,000-strong Swabian enclave adjacent to the Austrian frontier 
in West Hungary still had the opportunity to secede.27 Numerous complex 
factors persuaded these Germans to remain with Hungary, although their 
minds were by no means made up. Strong secessionist sentiments flared 
periodically in response to specific incidents and shifting economic and 
political conditions.28 
In the closing days of the war, Bleyer tried to guide Hungary ' s Swabians 
through the difficult days ahead. At heart a Hungarian patriot, he wanted 
to prevent West Hungary 's secession to Austria, remedy the loss of south-
ern Hungary to Yugoslavia, and insulate his people against the persuasive 
and sophisticated secessionist rhetoric of his rival for the leadership of 
Hungary 's Germans, Transylvanian Saxon Rudolf Brandsch.2 9 The Bleyer-
Brandsch leadership struggle profoundly influenced not only the unity of 
Hungary 's Germans but the relationship of Bleyer's Swabians with the 
Karolyi regime and later governments. The newspaper Neue Post, edited 
by Canon Johannes Huber, a close Bleyer collaborator, served as Bleyer 's 
principal propaganda forum. In an October 24 editorial, Bleyer questioned 
Brandsch's credentials to represent the Swabians. In his view, Brandsch's 
demands exceeded the bounds of propriety, and ignored Magyar sensibili-
ties. In contrast, he pointed out, the Swabians desired a package containing 
cultural, political, administrative, and economic reform short of autonomy. 
But the most important task was the restoration of German elementary 
schools. Bleyer insisted, however, that all decisions would have to be 
reached in perfect amity with the Magyars. 
Bleyer was determined to outmaneuver his Saxon adversary. On Novem-
ber 1 Bleyer, with the support of sixteen other Swabian intellectuals, 
founded and became the leader of the political organization Deutschun-
garischer Volksrat. The Party gained the immediate support and blessings 
of the newly installed Karolyi regime.3 ' Bleyer apparently enjoyed the 
government 's confidence from the start because of his well-known pro-
Magyar stance before and during the war, and because only a few days 
earlier, Huber had pleaded with Swabians languishing under Yugoslav oc-
cupation in southern Hungary to foil enemy attempts to annex the region. 
In his view, the Slavs constituted a mortal danger to Germans.3 2 Such at-
titudes linked Bleyer's Swabians with the new government in a patriotic 
cause against common foes. As a gesture of good will, the government 
permitted Bleyer to be the first to announce the formation of his party 
and reveal its programme. The Swabians, Bleyer pledged, would defend 
Hungary 's territorial integrity and not demand any rights that Hungary's 
other non-Magyars did not possess. Moreover, the Swabians had no desire 
for autonomy, he declared.3"' A few days later, Huber loosed a broadside 
that virtually accused Brandsch of plotting secession. Huber claimed that 
the Saxon leader considered the Magyar people as aliens, and wanted to 
promote a frigid, even hostile, relationship with them.34 
The fear that Hungary's Swabians might desert to Brandsch prompted 
Bleyer to chart a more defiant course with the government, lest he be ac-
cused of being a collaborator. As a result, hearty relations barely survived 
the first week of Karolyi's tenure in office. On November 8, Huber re-
joiced that the Swabians' national consciousness had been finally aroused. 
After being on the edge of national oblivion, Huber asserted, the Swabians 
demanded the revival of their German language.3^ The day before, Bleyer 
jolted Jaszi with a revised version of his Volksrat inaugural speech. In 
a November 7 Budapest declaration to the Volksrat, Bleyer informed the 
audience that he had just transmitted a copy of an appended Point 4 of his 
November 3 three point programme to Jaszi: "Our pledge of allegiance to 
the political Hungarian state stands only so long as it is not limited to the 
Magyar people alone, and only if the integrity of the Hungarian state can be 
maintained in its entirety. In all other instances we reserve the right of un-
conditional self-determination." Bleyer also firmed up an earlier demand: 
"We expect for German-Hungarians all those rights in politics, adminis-
tration, justice, economics, education and cultural life which the newly 
constituted Hungary has already vouchsafed for all its other non-Magyar 
peoples."36 
The speech might have prevented many lukewarm Bleyer supporters 
from deserting to Brandsch, and it might have rescued Bleyer's credibility 
as a vigorous Swabian leader; but the altered scenario for would-be Ma-
gyar-Swabian cooperation dismayed the Karolyi government and injured 
the Swabian cause. In effect, Bleyer was threatening the Karolyi regime 
in its most difficult hour. Hungary 's minorities were deserting in droves, 
and the Entente was ready to invade Hungary. On one hand, Bleyer was 
professing fidelity to Hungary and swearing solidarity with the Magyars, 
while on the other hand he seemed to be undermining the country's security 
by demanding the right of Swabians to exercise self-determination. The 
Swabian cause might have been better served had Bleyer forthrightly called 
for autonomy, an arrangement Jaszi was prepared to grant at that time. 
Although, in his view, every people had the legal and moral right to demand 
self-determination, shortly after war 's end, "self-determination" served as 
a euphemism for "secession." Claiming such a privilege at that particular 
moment was a grave error. In vain did Franz Bonitz, a Bleyer colleague 
in the Volksrat, urge Swabians to "march shoulder to shoulder with Ma-
gyardom," because simultaneously he also advocated "a united [German] 
front [to be demonstrated] to the public both at home and abroad, with 
respect to our cultural, linguistic, political and economic aspirations."37 
Bleyer's political instincts regarding Brandsch's quest for the leadership 
of Hungary's Germans had been sound. On November 10, the Saxon leader 
founded a rival organization, the Deutscher Volksrat fiir Ungarn (DVU). Un-
like Bleyer, Brandsch was a liberal with a large following among Transyl-
vanian Saxons and Hungarian-Swabian urban working classes and miners. 
The DVU boasted several influential Social Democrats among its leaders, 
such as the Jewish Heinrich Kalmar and the Swabian Viktor Knaller. Here 
was a paradox. The ultra-conservative Bleyer was willing to cooperate with 
the leftist Karolyi, whereas the ideologically congenial Brandsch wanted to 
wrest as many concessions from the hard-pressed Karolyi as possible. All 
the while he was secretly negotiating with the Rumanians. The DVU de-
manded cultural autonomy and the right to exercise self-determination, and 
refused to swear unconditional allegiance to Hungary. Its leaders merely 
pledged to maintain Hungary's territorial integrity as long as possible.38 
Stiffened Swabian resolve, fears of Saxon defection, and mounting signs 
of Austrian annexationist designs in West Hungary (Moson, Sopron and Vas 
counties) with its sizable German population39 prompted Jaszi to promul-
gate a flood of regulations to prove the Hungarian government 's honourable 
intentions to the non-Magyar minorities. On November 16, Magyar-lan-
guage instruction terminated in the first two elementary school grades in 
predominantly German-speaking regions. The Neue Post rejoiced. Appar-
ently, the new government meant to deal honourably with Swabians after 
all, and this was a good omen for the future. In an emotional outburst, 
Bleyer characterized his sentiments for Hungary as love for mother, those 
for Germandom as love for father. This easily-won victory prompted new 
demands. On November 20, the Volksrat clamored for exclusively German 
schools in Swabian districts, and demanded German as an official language 
in the courts and in the administration of predominantly Swabian areas. The 
Volksrat also wanted non-Germans barred from interfering in Swabian af-
fairs. As the Neue Post expressed it, "we desire to be represented in public 
life only by men who stand close to us."40 
Hungary's diplomatic and military position deteriorated steadily, yet 
Bleyer and his associates maintained their patriotic air. They steadfastly 
urged West Hungarians to remain loyal to Hungary in the face of increasing 
Austrian efforts to annex West Hungary's Germans. They cautioned fel-
low Swabians that the loss of a quarter-million Germans to Austria would 
weaken the German cause in Hungary, because the few remaining Swabi-
ans would be cut off from the German-speaking world.4 ' The government 
and the Magyar public, however, believed that the Bleyer group was less 
interested in maintaining Hungary 's territorial integrity than in preserving 
German influence in Hungary. 
In order to purchase Swabian loyalty, Minister of Education and Re-
ligion, Marton Lovaszy, offered more concessions. As of November 21, 
German would become the mandatory language of instruction in the first 
two grades of Swabian elementary schools. Magyar would be taught as a 
subject, but only in subsequent years. The regulation would apply not only 
in state-sponsored schools, but be valid in church-run institutions as well.42 
This was a major concession. Nearly six out of seven Swabian schools were 
confessional institutions. Normally, legislation involving state schools had 
minimal impact on Swabian education, because church institutions were 
not obliged to obey. Three days later, Lovaszy promised Bleyer additional 
reforms. German instruction would be provided in Swabian kindergartens, 
and in all Magyar middle schools located in Swabian-inhabited areas 4 3 
Lovaszy's generosity was an empty gesture, however. All Swabian schools 
suffered from a critical shortage of teachers, and German instructors and 
textbooks in particular were in short supply 44 
Swabian disillusionment with Karolyi 's regime and Jaszi's minority poli-
cies became acute by year's end. The new school laws were not being en-
forced. The Swabians could not be certain whether the Karolyi government 
lacked the means or the desire to implement them in any meaningful way. 
Soon complaints began filtering into Volksrat headquarters that local offi-
cials were violating the education ordinances.4^ Even under normal peace-
t ime conditions, village and county officials enjoyed considerable freedom 
in the exercise of their authority, and frequently ignored directives from 
the central government. In the chaotic postwar environment, conservative 
functionaries, many of them patriotic Magyar refugees from the succes-
sor states, or fervent ethnic proselytes, assumed greater importance and 
influence than ever before.4 6 Pointing to the alleged perfidy of the seceded 
ethnic minorities, these officials frequently obstructed the Karolyi regime's 
attempts to introduce German instruction in the schools. Karolyi and Jaszi 
could claim with some justification that they had sincerely endeavoured to 
serve the cultural needs of the Swabian minority. It was not their fault if 
local and church authorities failed to comply with the central government 's 
directives. 
The Swabians became even more disillusioned when they discovered that 
the new regulations regarding the adoption of German in their schools were 
invalid, because Count Albert Apponyi ' s restrictive 1907 minority school 
law was never repealed 4 7 Despite Karolyi 's and Jaszi's good intentions, 
the Swabians were worse off now than before. Magyar instruction was 
curtailed for them, while an effective German education seemed barred.48 
Friedrich Lang, a Bleyer follower, explained how this situation affected 
Swabian youngsters. Swabian children attending Magyar schools were 
merely taught to parrot Magyar phrases without gaining the benefit of true 
comprehension, Lang asserted. This malpractice caused many children to 
become functionally illiterate, and, in addition, they frequently forgot their 
German mother tongue.49 
In view of these disappointing developments, the era of Magyar-Swabian 
good feelings rapidly terminated. On December 27, Geza Zsombor, a Ma-
gyarized Swabian of Jaszi 's radical party, announced in Sopron that unless 
West Hungary was granted immediate autonomy, the Swabians would pro-
claim an independent German republic. The crisis deepened when, a few 
days later, Brandsch's Saxons defected to Rumania.50 Bleyer could not 
resist gloating. In an open letter addressed to Jaszi he noted that Jaszi 's 
excessively permissive nationality policy had led to disaster, whereas his 
own views had been vindicated. "Whose judgment on the Brandsch crowd 
had been more accurate, yours or mine?" Bleyer taunted.51 Bleyer had 
few reasons for rejoicing. Despite valiant efforts to discredit Brandsch and 
the DVU with Hungary's German public, Bleyer only partially succeeded. 
Hungary 's rural Swabians stuck to him. Many leftist Swabians abandoned 
the DVU, remained in Hungary and supported the Karolyi regime, but dis-
liked Bleyer and were in turn ostracized by him.52 
The Saxon desertion embarrassed Karolyi and cast serious doubt on the 
viability of Jaszi's approach to solving Hungary's nationality problems. If 
Hungary 's non-Magyars were indeed patriotic Hungarians as Jaszi claimed, 
then why did the ideologically compatible Saxons desert so lightly? Could 
Jaszi hope to persuade the arch-conservative, ideologically hostile Bleyer 
and his Swabians, Hungary 's sole remaining Germans, to accept terms 
that the far more congenial Saxons had rejected? This turn of events pro-
pelled both the government and Bleyer to pursue defensive, opportunistic 
tactics. Karolyi no longer trusted the Swabians, and Jaszi soon became 
disillusioned with them as well. For now, he stuck to his earlier nation-
ality programme. Both men still wished to introduce fundamental social 
and economic reform to benefit Hungary's remaining German-speaking 
citizens. But these measures would have to be entrusted only to ideolog-
ically dependable individuals. The thoroughly isolated Bleyer, now the 
sole leader of a vastly shrunken Swabian following that lacked an effec-
tive intelligentsia, wished to salvage from the ruins some ethnic privileges 
that might preserve the unique Christian and ultra-conservative nature of 
Swabian rural society. Bleyer 's and Jaszi 's clashing objectives bred the 
distrust and eventual enmity that poisoned relations between Bleyer's Volk-
srat and the Karolyi government. In turn, this impasse rendered the Jaszi 
formula for obtaining ethnic peace in Hungary impossible to achieve. 
To many Magyars, Brandsch's betrayal was proof positive that all Ger-
mans were opportunists and potential traitors, and that Jaszi had bungled 
by negotiating with them.54 The politically inexperienced Volksrat mistak-
enly assumed, however, that with Brandsch gone, the remaining Swabians' 
relatively moderate demands would not be honored. Bleyer 's followers 
hinted that unless the government met their claims in full, they too might 
threaten secession. On January 11, 1919, the Volksrat added German mid-
dle schools and teacher academies to its list of demands, and insisted that 
Hungary provide Swabians with German primary education even in pre-
dominantly Magyar-speaking areas.55 On January 20, Swabians in Sopron 
again demonstrated for immediate autonomy, otherwise, they threatened, 
West Hungarians would secede and either proclaim an independent German 
republic or join Austria. 
The hard-pressed Karolyi government thereupon commissioned several 
conservative and moderate Germans, notably Peter Jekel, Guido Giindisch, 
and Otto Herzog, to draft a new statute that would grant Swabians ex-
traordinary privileges. However, Karolyi and Jaszi took no chances. A 
Magyar, Odon Berinkey, and the Jewish Heinrich Kalmar participated in 
the preparation of the document, and the final draft underwent modification 
by Jaszi before being approved by the Ministerial Council. By then, the 
Cabinet had serious misgivings about the wisdom of dispensing constitu-
tional largesse to non-Magyars, and Jaszi protested that the Swabians did 
not merit special consideration. 
Despite growing reservations in government circles regarding special 
treatment for minorities, Law VI of January 29 granted cultural and polit-
ical autonomy to Swabians in Hungary's predominantly German-speaking 
areas. This included control over administration, justice, education and 
religion. Political authority was vested in Deutschwestungarn (German 
West Hungary), although Hungary 's entire Swabian community became a 
legally distinct corporate body. In addition, the Swabians obtained a na-
tional assembly, a German ministry in the cabinet, district councils, and 
commissioners. Janos Junker became Minister of German Affairs, and 
Geza Zsombor emerged as governor of the autonomous district. 
After this, Jaszi 's active involvement in the Karolyi regime terminated. 
Jaszi realized that granting the minorities special privileges sounded good 
on paper, but that translating theory into practice had not produced a solu-
tion of the nationality question, and might even have caused the alienation 
of some of the minorities.56 Even this generous new autonomy law failed 
to satisfy Swabian aspirations. Bleyer and his supporters considered the 
regulation a government tactic designed to discourage further German de-
fections, as in West Hungary, and to lure back Swabians and others who had 
already seceded, as in southern Hungary and Transylvania. Although the 
concessions were generous, the manner of their enactment and application 
displeased the Volksrat and hence sharpened rather than soothed Magyar-
Swabian conflicts. Bleyer was offended, for example, because Kalmar, 
Karolyi 's State Secretary for German Affairs, had a major share in drafting 
the autonomy statute. Bleyer objected no less to Kalmar's Judaism and 
ideological incompatibility than to the government 's alleged impudence in 
foisting an "outsider" on the Swabians. A similar stigma clung to Berinkey, 
another non-Swabian architect of the law. Bleyer 's followers insisted that 
only Christian Swabians could be involved in their new jurisdiction, and 
complained strenuously when Zsombor, an alleged Magyar, became gover-
nor of Deutschwestungarn. Bleyer scorned the new autonomy law because 
it conflicted with his own views on the meaning of loyalty to the Hun-
garian nation. In his opinion, Hungary's destiny had to be resolved by 
the peace conference, hence Swabian autonomy was premature. Finally, 
Bleyer declared, cultural autonomy was the most far-reaching concession 
the Swabians ought to accept.57 
Following these major disagreements, Magyar-Swabian relations reached 
a breaking point. The Neue Post accused Karolyi of trying to sabotage his 
own autonomy statute, and of attempting to subvert Swabians by introduc-
ing Social Democratic officials and ideas into their midst.58 An editorial 
condemned Minister of Education Zsigmond Kunfi for having forbidden 
religious instruction in the schools, and pilloried him for planning to na-
tionalize education. This would enable the government to assume ideolog-
ical control over the education of Swabian youth, the newspaper charged.59 
The Swabian anti-government press campaign raged with great intensity, 
when Bleyer unexpectedly resigned from the Volksrat and terminated all 
contact with the Karolyi regime. On March 12, the Neue Post hinted that 
secession might be the only plausible alternative Swabians had in West 
Hungary, now that the government had mismanaged the autonomy decree. 
The newspaper complained that home rule had not brought economic secu-
rity to West Hungary. Swabians there needed Austrian markets for selling 
their produce, whereas Swabian industrial workers were used to being em-
ployed in well-paying jobs in Lower Austria. The Neue Post pleaded with 
the government to reverse its decision to isolate Austria from Hungary by 
erecting trade barriers, or by imposing excessively onerous criteria in the 
granting of border passes to Swabians. Moreover, the newspaper declared, 
autonomy was unworkable because Zsombor staffed his office exclusively 
with fellow Magyars and Magyarized Swabian radicals.60 
In the final weeks of Karolyi 's incumbency, secessionist activities in-
creased in frequency and intensity on both sides of the Austro-Hungarian 
border. Austrian agitators infiltrated West Hungary in the guise of pri-
vate citizens. Oscar Charmant, Hungary 's envoy in Vienna, identified the 
Vienna-based Fremdenblatt as the chief fomenter of anti-Magyar propa-
ganda in West Hungary. The Austrian government refused to curb the 
extremists, particularly since the Germans of West Hungary appeared to 
favour Austrian intervention. For example, the mayor of Fiirstenfeld, an 
East Austrian town, pursued his pro-Austrian annexationist campaign with 
undisguised enthusiasm. Now that Bleyer 's moderating influence was gone, 
all thoughts of compromise had ceased. On March 21, the Karolyi regime 
fell, destroyed by the combined weight of a multitude of issues, one of 
which was its inability to resolve the Swabian ethnic minority crisis. 
When Jaszi conceded several years later that creating a Danubian "East-
ern Switzerland" had been premature and would have to await a time when 
both nationalism and communism had disappeared as primary social forces 
f rom the world scene, he was still hoping for the eventual fulfillment of 
his dreams.61 The behaviour of Saxons and Swabians certainly confirmed 
the accuracy of Jaszi 's judgment that nationalism played a major role in 
spoiling the blueprints for a supranational federation of autonomous states. 
As the war ended, the Swabians and Saxons were both swept by mighty 
nationalistic currents. With the Saxons, nationalism had reached a fully 
mature state, overruling both ideological and patriotic considerations. The 
Saxons ignored their liberalism and their long-standing affiliation with the 
Hungarian nation and state because they were convinced that even under 
conservative Rumanian rule they would still be able to preserve their Ger-
man national essence. Jaszi had no success with the Swabians because, 
although they had been exposed to the same nationalistic tide as the Sax-
ons, they had not yet matured sufficiently as a people to be a nation. Had 
the Swabians reached the nationalistic stage of the Saxons, they probably 
would not have hesitated to accept the far reaching autonomy package even 
f rom a donor they despised, and whom they considered politically, socially 
and ideologically reprehensible. But the Swabians did mind that the views 
of their alien masters clashed with the standards they revered, which they 
considered more important than even the needs of the German nation. The 
Saxons and Swabians thus both rejected Jaszi 's autonomy plans, but for 
entirely different reasons. If the Swabian and Saxon behaviour is a typical 
reaction of two branches of the same nation at different stages of develop-
ment, then the application of Jaszi 's autonomy scheme for the pacification 
of polyethnic states may have a long wait, possibly even beyond the puta-
tive demise of nationalism and communism.6 2 Perhaps only a basic change 
in human nature itself, or possibly an imposed conformist Age of Religion 
would ensure the success of a scheme as complex as Jaszi's. 
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Jaszi's Viennese Years: Building Contacts 
with the Democratic Left in the Successor States 
Gyorgy Litvan 
The Viennese years of Oscar Jaszi were inserted between the two halves 
of his life, the Hungarian and the American ones. This period represents 
a kind of transition between these two lives, that of the Hungarian scholar 
and politician with international outlook, and that of the American professor 
with Hungarian preoccupations. Jaszi 's Vienna years gradually disrupted or 
transformed his former existence, family circumstances, professional and 
political ties, and prepared him for his "second life" in a new world, for a 
new marriage, a new profession, and for a new approach to old problems. 
"Since our last meeting in Budapest, a whole world had collapsed," Jaszi 
wrote to R.W. Seton-Watson in his first letter after the war.1 When he left 
Hungary for Vienna on 1 May 1919, the "May Day" of the Soviet Republic, 
he could not yet realize that his old world had vanished forever. When, in 
1925, he left Vienna for Oberlin, Ohio, he was already aware of it. 
The Vienna years were the most tormented ones in Jaszi 's long life. He 
spent them in a feverish state of constant inner crises and mental anguish, 
both public and private, and he could not calm down until after he had 
arrived in America. 
Despite this, his performance was extraordinary. He wrote an account of 
the Hungarian revolution and counter-revolution of 1918-19 in Hungarian, 
German and English;2 he attempted to draw up a balance-sheet of his social 
and economic theories in several book-sized manuscripts.1 He edited the 
daily Becsi Magyar Ujsag (Hungarian Newspaper of Vienna) for three years 
and wrote hundreds of articles for Hungarian, German and other journals. 
He lived in Vienna but made frequent and long trips to meet friends and 
relatives in the Successor States and in Italy. In 1923-24 he spent half a 
year on a lecture tour in the United States. All the time, he conducted an 
enormous correspondence and kept a diary which remains an indispensable 
source for the history of all the emigres, from the Liberals to the Com-
munists, and of their political and diplomatic efforts never mentioned in 
printed sources. 
As leaders of the democratic group of Hungarian exiles Jaszi and Mihaly 
Karolyi aimed, in the first months of 1920, at uniting in a common front 
most of the anti-Horthy exiles. There was, a single but important difference: 
Karolyi wanted to include the Communists, while Jaszi wished to keep them 
out in a neutral position. All these efforts for unification were frustrated 
by various disagreements, above all in regard to international orientation. 
The Communists (and Karolyi) looked towards Soviet Russia; the Social 
Democrats hoped for the aid of the Socialist International and the Socialist 
and Liberal public opinion of the West; while the Liberals were divided 
between pro-Habsburg and anti-Habsburg elements. 
Jaszi felt deeply disappointed by the Allies' attitudes and their peace-
making in East Central Europe. He declared Entente policy regarding 
Hungary "wrong and short-sighted."4 Though he never gave up faith in the 
values of Western democracy — and the usefulness of its liberal and socialist 
aspects —he sought support from sources he considered more immediately 
concerned. He thought to have found this in the Successor States, in the 
countries of the future Little Entente, whom he called the "allies of Hun-
garian Democracy." The paramount interest of the governments appeared 
to be the elimination of the revanchist Hungarian regime which seemed 
to be preparing for war against them and fomenting unrest among their 
Hungarian minorities. It was, therefore, only logical for Jaszi to build con-
tacts in these directions. He conceived this alliance not as a mere tactical 
one, necessary to defeat the Horthy regime, but as a long-term necessity 
in the strategy of seeking rapprochement with the Successor States, in the 
integration of Hungary in a new democratic environment and, as a final 
step, in a Danubian Confederation. 
He considered this work of contact-building as one of the most important 
tasks of the exiles and as his personal mission, because he felt to be the 
right man to accomplish it. Indeed, his past, his whole political record 
qualified him to negotiate with the political and intellectual leaders of the 
Danubian states and to try to persuade them to assume a tough attitude 
towards the Hungarian regime and a friendly one towards the Hungarian 
people —at home and in their own countries. Actually, this was the very 
same plan which he had been unable to realize in 1918 as Hungarian 
minister of nationalities. Now he tried to initiate it from abroad and hoped 
to co-operate with his former adversaries, the Czech and Rumanian leaders. 
Meanwhile, he distanced himself from all kinds of Magyar nationalism 
and was ready to accept the basic condition of any co-operation with the 
Successor States: the acknowledgment of the status quo and the renounc-
ing of the idea of forcible revision of the Trianon treaty. The Karolyi-Jaszi 
group was the first and, for a long time, the only Hungarian political con-
stellation which recognized the lasting nature of the post-1920 international 
order in East Central Europe. This stand separated them from the over-
whelming majority of their compatriots. They were denounced as "traitors" 
and "Masaryk 's agents" by official Hungary and the entire right-wing press. 
Jaszi shouldered defiantly this role for 25 years, without abandoning his 
patriotic feelings, and his loyalty to Hungary 's true national interests. 
In a memorial talk on Thomas G. Masaryk, given before the Assembly 
of Oberlin College in 1937, Jaszi related that he once asked the Presi-
dent: "If you were a Hungarian statesman, what would you do?" Masaryk 
answered: "Well, in this hypothetical case I would try to do two things: 
First, I would fight for an honest carrying out of national autonomy for the 
Hungarians. In the second place, I would advocate the return to Hungary 
of those territories in the frontier regions where the Magyars constitute 
a solid, homogeneous majority."5 Undoubtedly, Jaszi quoted these words 
as the supreme justification of his own stand. He had exactly the same 
two reservations in his friendship to and moral support of the" Successor 
States. The first one he outlined in an editorial about the possible alliance 
of the Democratic exiles. Hungarian Democracy, he wrote, may renounce 
revanche but can never give up claiming the same rights for its separated 
Hungarian kinsmen which it had demanded before the war for the op-
pressed nationalities of old Hungary.6 The second reservation, a peaceful 
correction of the new frontiers in favour of a democratic Hungary, Jaszi 
found impolitic to declare publicly, but raised it in his private talks with 
Czech statesmen. 
These confidential talks started in October 1919, when Jaszi visited 
Masaryk, Benes and Tusar in Prague, for the first time. His visits there 
became regular during the next years. Czechoslovakia was, as the first 
democracy in Central Europe, the most important country in Jaszi 's inter-
national connections. 
On March 30, 1920, together with Mihaly Karolyi and Pal Szende, Jaszi 
had a long and decisive conversation in Prague with Eduard Benes. Ac-
cording to Jaszi 's diary, the Hungarians put the following questions to the 
Czech statesman: 1. Whether Benes saw any sense in an organized Hun-
garian political emigration without the participation of the Communists? 
2. Whether Czechoslovakia was willing to redress the injustices of the 
Peace Treaty? 3. Whether Benes was ready to acknowledge the Hungarian 
democratic emigration in a semi-official way? 7 
Benes answered all the three questions in the positive. He asserted that 
the regime in power in Budapest was unacceptable and intolerable, because 
"this feudal island cannot maintain itself amidst the democratic Successor 
States." He assured his visitors that he regarded them as the only group 
suitable for leading Hungary and for creating a new equilibrium in East 
Central Europe. The most important thing was, Benes emphasized, to 
create honest and sincere communication between the democratic forces of 
their nations. 
This was exactly what Jaszi wanted to hear and to put into practice. 
During the following months he greatly extended the range of his activ-
ity. In November 1920, he made his first Balkan tour, visiting Belgrade, 
Bucharest, and Zagreb, to meet both the government and opposition leaders 
of Yugoslavia and Rumania . . . 
I felt the necessity for some time, [he said in a statement] to inform 
the Southern Slav and Rumanian political circles about the true situa-
tion of Hungary and on the views of the Hungarian democrats and, at 
the same time, to build direct contacts with the democratic and pro-
gressive wing of these circles. Also, I received invitations from my 
old Yugoslav and Rumanian friends to renew our connections which 
were interrupted by the war and the revolutions. Of course, I spoke 
everywhere in my own name, but I am sufficiently familiar with the 
conception of all shades of Hungarian exile [opinion] to feel entitled 
to speak also in the name of the others, except for the Communists 
who continue their policy of the world-revolution catastrophy. 
My conception, [Jaszi continued] presented to the South Slav and 
Rumanian democratic public opinion, was roughly as follows: The 
Hungarian problem concerns closely the Little Entente. Without its 
proper solution it is impossible to create those conditions which would 
allow the development of Central Europe. Hungary is the Archimedean 
point of this fatally sick Central European world. This must be the 
starting point of either a regeneration or a final dissolution . . . the 
collapse of the Horthy regime is therefore the vital interest of the Little 
Entente.8 
However, he warned against a military intervention. Instead, he proposed 
political pressure, insistence on demobilization, and a delay of the evacua-
tion of the Southern town of Pecs and Baranya county by Yugoslavia. At 
the same time he advocated free trade and a solution of the problem of the 
Hungarian minorities whose situation he defined as depressing. 
The poor refugee —coming from a Viennese bed and breakfast place, 
and traveling day and night by slow trains —was received as a statesman 
and a true friend by Pasic, Pribicevic, Drashkovic and others in Belgrade, 
by Averescu, Take Ionescu, Gareflid, Duca, Octavian Goga and other min-
isters, Iuliu Maniu, Bratianu, Iorga Mihalache, Gusti and other leaders in 
Bucharest. Some wanted to introduce him to the King. However, his 
person was better received than his proposals. 
"I got many encouragements but no definite promises," Jaszi wrote to 
Karolyi. "The leftist parties and the young people greeted my ideas enthu-
siastically, while the right-wing parties and old people did not understand 
me. Averescu or Take Ionescu would more easily communicate with an 
agent of Horthy. In spite of their great politeness, their old diplomatic 
and militaristic brains cannot accept the thought that there are Hungarians 
who oppose revanche sincerely and in principle."9 Very soon, however, 
Jaszi had to experience a similar attitude displayed by the "modern" and 
"progressive" representatives of the Successor States. 
In March 1921, just a few days after the Karolyi family was expelled 
from Italy and Jaszi was prevented from boarding a ship in Naples bound 
for the United States, Eduard Benes met the Hungarian foreign minister 
Gusztav Gratz. The Successor States began to accommodate themselves to 
the Horthy regime, which they actually preferred to a strong and democratic 
government in Hungary, which might have been attractive to the Magyar 
minorities of their own countries. Accordingly, their relations with the 
emigres became looser and more businesslike. They regarded them rather 
as political tools than allies and partners for the f iture. 
Jaszi, too, began to differentiate more sharply between the governmental 
and the genuinely democratic forces in the Successor States. He trusted less 
and less the former and tried to base the cause of a Danubian rapprochement 
on the latter. Before the end of 1921 he presented a detailed plan of a 
Danubian Cultural League to be formed of the democratic elements and 
the intellectual elite of these countries. The tasks of this multinational 
organization would have been to make mutually known the history and 
culture of every Danubian nation, to analyze their social and economic 
problems, to popularize their cultural achievements, to publish a review, 
to organize conference and —last but not least —to combat chauvinism and 
defend the national and human rights of the minorities in each country. A 
remarkable plan indeed, even for today! 
The problem was, however, the weakness of such independent elements 
and forces in East Central Europe. The keenest interest for Jaszi 's plan was 
shown in Rumania, both among the Rumanian intellectuals in Bucharest and 
the Hungarians in Transylvania. The left-wing Bucharest review Revista 
Vremii published a series of articles by Jaszi on Danubian problems and on 
the proposed cultural league.10 
In May, 1923, Jaszi spent three weeks in Bucharest and in six cities 
in Transylvania. Again, he was received sympathetically by political au-
thorities and scholars in the capital. In Transylvania, however, he was 
confronted with the daily practice of Rumanian nationality policy and the 
realities of minority life. He had to realize that his benevolent urging for 
an active and loyal civic attitude became, in the eyes of the Hungarians, 
tantamount to national submission. During this dramatic trip he came to see 
clearer than ever before that the policy of the Little Entente, which was tol-
erant towards the Hungarian regime and intolerant towards the Hungarian 
minorities, was ruining and compromising his own position and activity. 
At the end of his journey, like a deux ex machina, R.W. Seton-Watson 
appeared in Kolozsvar [Cluj] and Jaszi, according to his diary, shared with 
him his doubt whether it was permissible to continue his political activity 
and to keep up his one-sided alliance with Prague, Bucharest, and Belgrade. 
Seton-Watson, as Jaszi noted, "understood the dilemma and promised to 
tell Bene§ that he [BeneS] must decide whether he will or will not cooperate 
with the [Hungarian] exiles."11 
Benes, however, as Jaszi himself suspected, had very much changed his 
mind since 1920. Jaszi believed that the Czech leader was thinking the 
fol lowing way: "the exiles, once they get home, would pursue the same 
nationalist policy of territorial integrity [as Horthy does]. Otherwise, the 
exile is not an appropriate partner because he passed the limit which no 
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emigre should, vis-a-vis his country's public opinion." In this cynical 
view, Jaszi was sadly right. Still, he was unable and unwilling to change 
his mind on the future of Danubia and the necessity of an understanding 
with the Successor States. Since he was prevented from representing this 
idea in all honesty on the political level and on the spot, he had no other 
choice but to abandon politics in favour of scholarship, and leave Danubia 
and head for America. 
As an independent American scholar, in the 1930s, he criticized the do-
mestic policies and minority policies of the Successor States, even those 
of Czechoslovakia.13 But he maintained his sympathy towards this endan-
gered democracy, especially in the dark years of 1938-39. For this attitude, 
Oscar Jaszi had to pay a high price in terms of his relations with Hungary, 
and most of his compatriots. 
Nevertheless, he was ready to pay this price in the hope that the Czech 
leaders learned their lesson from the easy collapse of their multinational 
states, and that they will promote —as Benes had personally promised him 
during the war in Chicago —Danubian understanding and federation after 
the conflict. 
When, in 1945, he witnessed the opposite trend, Jaszi tried to do ev-
erything to stop the forcible expulsion of the Hungarian minorities f rom 
Slovakia. He wrote letters to Benes,14 Harold J. Laski,15 British journalist 
W. Steed, and, in the end, to the New York Times}6 And in a private letter, 
he confessed to his beloved first wife that the great mistake of his life had 
been overestimating "our Czechs!"17 
Jaszi 's efforts to establish closer contacts with democratic elements in 
neighbouring countries did not have many supporters in the seventy years 
after his arrival in Vienna. Even his call for the establishment of a Danubian 
Cultural League has fallen on deaf ears. 
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Some Reflections on Oscar Jaszi 
and his Philosophy of History 
Thomas Szendrey 
Bringing together the scholarly aspirations and political career of Oscar 
Jaszi with the field and subject matter of the philosophy of history requires 
not only an understanding of Jaszi's intellectual, specifically philosophical, 
development and major contours of his thought as expressed in his nu-
merous writings and extensive correspondence, but also an understanding 
of what one means by the term philosophy of history and the intellectual 
and cultural context in which it was undertaken. This is complicated even 
further by the meanings and values attached to the philosophy of history 
by the one who is reflecting on these issues.1 
Basically, we are engaged in a dialogue about what is the philosophy of 
history, what it meant for Jaszi, who never wrote specifically and at length 
about it, only episodically in works dealing mostly with social and politi-
cal philosophy. The social and intellectual context in which Jaszi worked 
opened concerns generally and properly characterized as a philosophy of 
history, and led to subsequent understandings (or for that matter misunder-
standings) of this complex of ideas. There can be no doubt that Jaszi was 
not first and foremost a philosopher of history as that term will be defined 
and used in these reflections; however, he did reflect, and often very mean-
ingfully and perceptively, on issues and matters central to the philosophy 
of history, such as the idea of progress, the nature and role of social sci-
ence, especially its essentially positivist variant, in the understanding of the 
nature of human society, including also the issues of the relationship of the 
individual and society, the problem of historical materialism, philosophy of 
the state, the issues concerning human destiny, and ultimately a compelling 
critique of the Marxist philosophy of history, coupled with a statement of 
his own ideals for humanity generally and a statement of the development 
of society and the proper role and status of the individual.2 
Before turning to some reflections on these themes by citing passages 
from some of Jaszi 's writings, two points previously alluded to should 
be developed at least briefly. The first of these is what is meant by the 
philosophy of history and the relationship of sociology to the philosophy 
of history, an issue which also much concerned Jaszi and was inevitably 
among his concerns and that of his contemporaries.3 The second is the 
intellectual and socio-cultural context in which Jaszi's ideas developed, 
only to the extent necessary in so brief a discussion and one not centered 
specifically upon that point.4 
It is necessary to state at the very inception of an attempt to explain 
what one means by the philosophy of history to point out that it is by no 
means only a Weltanschauung or complex of attitudes about the issues of 
human destiny, although the philosophy of history generally commences, 
at least in one respect, precisely with such issues and concerns. Certainly, 
any attempt to explain the nature of human existence, individual and social, 
can and does lead to the formulation of a philosophy of history. Hence, 
concern with the nature of human existence —of necessity in time —and the 
direction and goal of human effort (what Karl Jaspers in a book entitled 
The Origin and Goal of History has attempted to explain) constitutes a 
fundamental dimension of the philosophy of history. This was so aptly 
described by Karl Lowith in a book dealing with thinkers as diverse as St. 
Augustine, Vico, Voltaire, Condorcet, Comte, Proudhon and Marx; among 
these Voltaire first used the term philosophy of history in a modern context 
and many of the others tried to explain what it was, namely an attempt to 
explain in some way the meaning of human history. It must be noted, in 
order to establish some relationship between our concern with Jaszi and 
the philosophy of history generally, that Jaszi was deeply influenced in his 
thought, inevitably in an eclectic manner, by most of the thinkers above 
mentioned. For example, his belief in the idea of progress was derived 
from the thinkers of the Enlightenment tradition, whereas his sociological 
interests, the concern with historical materialism, the evolution of social 
consciousness, from Saint-Simon and Comte as well as Darwin, Marx, 
and Spencer. Jaszi wrote about these thinkers in numerous essays, but 
especially, in one entitled, "The Marxian Paradox," 1941, to wit: 
There is nothing surprising in the simultaneous elaboration of the 
democratic and the socialistic doctrines . . . liberalism and socialism 
are Siamese twins . . . children of the two most fundamental dynamic 
forms, Equality and Freedom. Socialism simply asserted that consti-
tutional democracy alone cannot realize true Equality and Freedom 
without giving them an economic foundation. This was the point of 
view of the great pre-Marxian socialists of the first half of the nine-
teenth century, who practically laid down all the foundations for the 
later Marxian synthesis.5 
Jaszi was to develop further these ideas not only in his critique of the Marx-
ist philosophy of history, but also used the thought of these pre-Marxian 
socialists in the development and formulation of his own ideas concern-
ing the nature and development of human society, which he himself often 
characterized as liberal and democratic socialism. It should be added that 
in his opinion the theories of these pre-Marxian (and later the revisionists 
such as Eduard Bernstein) socialists did not endanger democracy, which in 
his estimation —especially in his later writings —was not the case with the 
message of Marxist socialism, which he considered catastrophic and essen-
tially anti-democratic, indeed approaching a new and inflexible religious 
orthodoxy.6 
Continuing the point that one branch of the philosophy of history entails 
the recognition of pattern and meaning in the ever-evolving human condi-
tion, then the recognition of great, indeed even cosmic and new forces in 
human history, indicates a concern with such philosophical issues. Jaszi 's 
explanation of the social and cultural conditions engendered by a gigan-
tic and blind technological upheaval which uprooted social and individual 
relations (the industrial revolution and the political upheavals of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries) certainly helps one to under-
stand the success of the Marxist philosophy of history, especially what was 
characterized (by Engels) as Marx ' s discovery of the evolutionary laws of 
human society. Thus, Jaszi 's subsequent critique of the Marxist philosophy 
of history was accompanied by an understanding of the appeal of Marx ' s 
theories to a society which had lost its traditional moorings. 
Actually, Jaszi examined Marxism in at least four ways: 1. As a philo-
sophical, sociological, and moral doctrine; 2. An economic interpretation 
of history; 3. A guide to political action and certainly most significantly 
from the point of view of the speculative philosophy of history, 4. A nor-
mative ideal for future development which of necessity must follow from 
the pattern expounded by Marx. Jaszi further believed that the historical 
materialism of Marx was helped along by a behaviorist attitude informed 
by the belief that human nature can be conditioned, a position Marx shared 
with many other social scientists. Thus, Jaszi's understanding of Marxist 
thought and his constantly increasing disagreements with it,7 represented 
perhaps his most significant incursion into a speculative philosophy of his-
tory. In the essay cited previously, Jaszi concluded his discussion of Marx 
in the following words: "Here is a man who regards human nature in all 
history with contempt and pessimism, yet who prophesies for the future a 
human nature purified from baser motives."8 This theme became the basis 
of his subsequent discussion and critique of Marxism as practiced by Marx-
ists in power, but even more outspokenly than his critique of the thought of 
Marx himself. Before dealing with that briefly, here one might only note 
that Jaszi 's ethical idealism (probably the best term for Jaszi 's position 
in terms of social and political thought) expounded in some of his more 
philosophical works may indeed represent an unwarranted belief in the ef-
ficacy of progress and enlightenment-based optimism about human nature 
generally. These are also ideas of interest to the speculative philosophy 
of history, indeed to any philosophically based concern with issues of hu-
man destiny and the meaning of human existence in time. One could thus 
argue that Jaszi concerned himself with the philosophy of history mostly 
through a critique of the philosophy of history expounded by Marx and the 
Marxists. 
A concern with the meaning of human history by no means exhausts 
the concerns of the philosophy of history, since the field also has a dimen-
sion which adheres more to logic and epistemology rather than metaphysics 
(broadly conceived, perhaps ontology, and also ethics or moral philosophy), 
namely the question of how one can know past events or more specifically 
the nature of historical knowledge. Obviously, our ability to obtain knowl-
edge of ourselves and the social world, or more precisely the explanation 
of that, has also concerned philosophers of history, social theorists, and 
philosophers generally. The search for pattern, meaning, and direction is 
decidedly related to how one obtains knowledge of human history broadly 
conceived. For example, the attempt to discover the patterns or so-called 
laws of social development in the study of economic factors only, or even 
primarily, is not only an issue in the realm of a speculative philosophy of 
history, but also mandates a method for the study of such phenomena. This 
particular economic interpretation of history — derived from Marx and dealt 
with by Jaszi among many others —makes use of the methods of social sci-
ence and the critical examination of these social sciences and indeed also the 
related evolutionary theories (derived from Darwin and formulated among 
others by Spencer) and Jaszi 's discussion of these issues in his major theo-
retical works9 form the core of his contributions to what can be considered 
the philosophy of history in both the speculative and analytical domains. 
Jaszi was certainly deeply concerned with questions of the methodology of 
the social sciences, a topic very germane to the methodological concerns 
of history as a discipline. 
Jaszi, for example, pointed out that an economic determinism is not 
really tenable and one must have recourse to spiritual and moral factors, 
independently of the materialistic conception inherent in economic deter-
minism. Indeed, this was his major objection to the Marxist philosophy 
of history in its original Marxian form and even more in its subsequent 
development into what Jaszi called a system of state religion.10 These crit-
icisms were noted especially in his recently published posthumous work, 
where he stated that much harm had been done by the political practice 
of Marxist-inspired revolutions based upon what Jaszi considered to be the 
faulty philosophy of history espoused by Marx. His major critical observa-
tions weFe directed against the idea of catastrophic revolutionary rhetoric, 
the exclusive revolutionary role of the proletariat, a one-sided materialistic 
conception of historical development, and a series of what Jaszi considered 
flippant generalizations about the history of the 100 years before 1848.11 
He further implies that this half-mystical, half-revolutionary dialectic must 
be replaced by another dialectic more carefully constructed to reveal social 
changes independently of revolutionary rhetoric. Marx, according to Jaszi, 
helped to provide a method for the analysis of social change, but it must be 
used without recourse to this revolutionary praxis which for Jaszi distorted 
the method. Jaszi also objected to the excessively materialistic determi-
nation of intellectual, cultural, and moral life and ideals. He emphasized 
that this spiritual-moral ideology was also a creative activity in itself and 
without it all social progress would come to an end. 
Specifically in terms of the issues of the philosophy of history, Jaszi's 
one leading idea was his deeply held belief in the idea of progress, from 
the essentials of which he never deviated and which he held until the end 
of his life. For him, however, the idea and the fact of progress was by no 
means limited to the socio-economic sphere, but found its most significant 
dimension in the spiritual and especially moral realm. In his words: 
Really good scholarship, outstanding art, properly understood moral-
ity, even religion conceived in a proper manner, can never loose its 
contact with suffering individuals and the realistic needs of the masses. 
Every truly progressive spiritual (szellemi) activity satisfies a spiritual 
need, resolves a pressing concern, or carries forward a progressive 
tendency.12 
Even though this particular statement deals specifically with the nature 
of progress and does so more on the spiritual-cultural rather than socio-
economic level, Jaszi still remained committed to progress, but certainly 
not in a Marxian or even materialist context. He argued that ultimately all 
progress was nurtured in the human soul and that this was as evident as 
any of the theorems of Euclid. What he called the creative impulses of 
the human spirit he saw as the basis of all of world history.13 Ultimately, 
therefore, Jaszi too was a visionary of the creative possibilities inherent in 
the human spirit and he gradually moved away from the Marxist concep-
tion which he had considered necessary in his earlier works. Summing up 
his critique of Marxism, one may point out that Jaszi eventually expressed 
it in five statements as follows. First of all, he stated that the Marxist phi-
losophy of history was based upon a simplified set of generalizations about 
the era of bourgeois revolutions based upon incomplete and inexact infor-
mation. Secondly, Marx attached undue significance to the class struggle 
and underestimated the role of social solidarity. Third, Marx's entire con-
ception was mechanically fatalistic and attempted to eliminate the creative 
force of the human spirit as a factor in progress. Fourth, in conjunction 
with this Jaszi asserted that Marx eliminated all true morality from history, 
making it only a reflection of the class struggle or the so-called "morality" 
of struggle. Finally, Jaszi stated that the Marxist vision of the future was in 
turn catastrophic and vague.14 In place of this, Jaszi developed a vision of 
liberal and democratic socialism, cleansed of dogmatic elements. However 
Utopian his vision —and Jaszi believed in the creative force of such Utopian 
visions —his belief in progress, especially the progressive realization of the 
human spirit, remained with him and was the major motif of his historical 
vision and philosophy. 
There are other issues in the writings of Jaszi, as well as statements of 
the significance of progress in his political tracts and newspaper articles 
written under the pressure of revolutionary events,15 which dealt with one 
or another issue of the philosophy of history, be it a belief in moral progress 
which illuminated his political and sociological writings, his concern with 
the extension of modern ideas in a Hungarian context —he once wrote that 
a new philosophy of history is needed to renew faith in Hungary 's future16 
— or his understanding of the role of great individuals in history,17 but 
ultimately I think it is essential to place Jaszi 's concerns in the context 
of Hungarian intellectual life at the turn of the century. Perhaps a few 
observations about the pervasiveness of social problems in Hungarian life 
in the early years of the twentieth century will explain Jaszi 's intellectual 
development in some manner. 
The concern with social thought and the establishment of social reform 
movements permeated every realm of homan activity. Oscar Jaszi posed a 
whole series of questions about land reform, the nationality issue, the role 
of sociology in public life, and a critique of the Marxist vision of history 
from the point of view of bourgeois radicalism; Gyorgy Lukacs opened the 
way to the social analysis of literature with his writings on modern drama; 
Bodog Somlo and Gyula Pikler combined psychological and sociological 
observations with the study of public law and jurisprudence; issues of social 
ills agitated writers such as Endre Ady and Dezso Szabo, churchmen such 
as Laszlo Ravasz and Ottokar Prohaszka, Catholic scholars such as Sandor 
Giesswein, socialists such as Zsigmond Kunfi and Ervin Szabo. One should 
also recall that Arnold Hauser 's social analysis of art and Karl Mannheim's 
sociology of knowledge were also influenced by these same movements of 
thought and social reform. The list could be extended, even specified 
and detailed, but the intellectual and cultural milieu of Jaszi was strongly 
influenced by it. 
Out of this maelstrom of ideas emerged some of those concerns which 
forced thinkers to face up to the ultimate questions, especially those posed 
most evidently and compellingly by the philosophy of history. On the 
issues of most concern to human beings the ultimate question is not to what 
century one belongs, or one particular thinker such as Jaszi belongs, but 
rather how one transcends the ever-changing human condition to understand 
the essence of our very being. Jaszi 's vision, however limited by his age 
and his values, was nonetheless open to this dimension. That is why one 
can discuss his thought in terms of the philosophy of history. 
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Oscar Jaszi and the "Hungarian Problem:" 
Activities and Writings during World War II 
N.F. Dreisziger 
If it is fair to say that Oscar Jaszi 's life can be divided into two halves, 
the Hungarian and the American, it can also be said that World War I and 
II were the respective plateaus of these two half-lives. Much has been 
published on Jaszi 's activities, as well as the evolution of his ideas, during 
the Great War,1 but very little on what he was doing—or thinking—during 
World War II. Undoubtedly, this imbalance in the historical literature on 
Jaszi 's career is a reflection of the fact that 1914 to 1918 constituted the 
zenith of his political career; moreover, he was in the prime of his life, 
full of energy and intellectual vigour. And though he must have been 
displeased by negative reception of many of his ideas in his country, by 
the failure of some of his political ventures, and by the outbreak of the war 
itself in 1914, the greatest disappointments of his life were still ahead of 
him. 
By the Second World War Jaszi 's circumstances had changed. In par-
ticular, his political prospects had greatly diminished. He, along with his 
1918 platform to reform Hungary, had been rejected. Even his career as 
an emigre statesman had come to an end by the early 1920s, and he had 
become a political exile, an emigre academic. There were other profound 
disappointments behind him as well by this time, including the mistreat-
ment of his nation by the peacemakers in 1919-1920, and his own rejection 
by the statesmen of the Successor States soon after the conclusion of the 
postwar peace treaties. Jaszi 's spirit had not been crushed, however. De-
spite the setbacks he had suffered, he retained a fair reservoir of hope for 
the future. With whatever strength and energy he could muster—he was 
approaching retirement age — he continued to work for his beliefs and ideals 
throughout the Second World War and after. 
Jaszi 's political aim during the Second World War was very much the 
same as it had been during the First: a thoroughgoing reform of Hungarian 
politics and society, and the establishment of a confederation of the peoples 
of the Danube Valley. How Jaszi wanted to achieve these, kept changing 
with the evolving political and strategic situation, just as he had grasped at 
different political constellations during the First World War while working 
toward a democratic Hungary, at peace with its neighbours. But a few 
elements of his strategy remained constant and remind one of his endeavors 
during World War I. He never missed a chance to denounce his native 
country's conservative ruling elite and their alleged or real reactionary 
policies, and he lived an active public life. 
As we know, Jaszi's efforts in the early 1940s were just as, or even 
more, unsuccessful than his earlier ones had been. Not only did history 
deny him —even more profoundly than in 1918 —a chance to implement his 
ideas, but the end of the new war brought renewed disillusionment, equal 
perhaps to what he had felt after the First World War. Jaszi 's reactions to 
the events of World War II, his activity during the conflict, have never been 
fully documented. Neither have his writings of the period been analyzed 
or reprinted. This paper will begin to redress this gap in the historical 
literature. 
As war clouds gathered on the European horizon during the mid-1930s, 
Jaszi experienced still another of his frustrations with the post-World War 
I situation in East Central Europe. In 1935 he crossed the Atlantic again to 
tour this part of the world once more. Prior to his visit, he was under the 
impression that the only feudalistic and militaristic country in the region 
was Hungary, and cherished the hope that a thoroughgoing reform in that 
country would lead to a general reconciliation among the peoples of the 
Danube Valley. His visit to Czechoslovakia and, especially, to Rumania and 
Yugoslavia, left him far less optimistic about the prospects of East Central 
Europe. What he found there was inter-ethnic tensions, hate-mongering, 
xenophobia and the undue influence of "unbalanced intellectuals" in pol-
itics. He concluded that the Successor States were plagued by the same 
nationality problems and intra-national antagonisms as the old Habsburg 
'l 
Empire before 1918. The outcome of the visit was his even stronger con-
viction that the postwar division of East Central Europe into independent 
small states had been a failure and that their only hope for the future would 
be the creation of a federal structure, "combined with a complete cultural 
and administrative autonomy of the variegated national minorities. . . " 4 
Jaszi and his fellow exiles were slow to make political moves in response 
to the outbreak of the Second World War, primarily because Hungary did 
not get involved in the conflict until 1941. In fact, it was the conserva-
tive camp of the Hungarian immigrant and emigre community in the United 
States that took the initiative in wartime organizational w o r k ? Much of this 
activity was inspired by the regime in Budapest. Throughout the interwar 
years, the Horthy regime had cultivated contacts with the patriotic elements 
in North America 's Hungarian community. The leading political institution 
for Hungarians in the United States v/as the American Hungarian Federa-
tion, an organization which to some extent owed its existence to the ruling 
elite in Budapest.6 After the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, 
Hungary 's government redoubled its efforts at strengthening its influence 
in the Hungarian-American community. Part of the reason for this policy 
was Prime Minister Pal Teleki planned to create of a wartime government-
in-exile in case Hungary fell under Nazi domination.7 Obviously, such a 
government, whether established in the United States or in another of the 
North Atlantic democracies, would need the support of influential ethnic 
community organizations such as the American Hungarian Federation. 
In November 1940, Janos Pelenyi, the Hungarian Minister to Washing-
ton, and several members of his staff, resigned their posts and sought 
asylum in the United States. As political refugees they could expect 
to have a freer hand in directing the activities of the patriotic wing of 
the Magyar-American community. Indeed, two months later, in January 
1941, Hungarian-America's leading personalities gathered at a conference 
in Washington to lay the foundations for a free Hungarian government in 
the West, should fate require its establishment.8 
To head a Hungarian government in the free world, Hungary 's political 
elite of decided to send one of its members into voluntary exile. Their 
choice fell on Tibor Eckhardt who secretly left Hungary through still neutral 
Yugoslavia in early March. Though by the late-1930s Eckhardt had moved 
to the centre-left of the Hungarian political spectrum, his selection as a 
spokesman for the Hungarian diaspora in the West proved to be a mistake. 
The fact was that during the post-Word War I turmoil, Eckhardt had been a 
vocal right-winger, a fact which had made him persona non grata with the 
leftist faction of the Hungarian emigration in the United Kingdom and the 
Americas.9 Jaszi, in particular, loathed Eckhardt with singular vehemence. 
Eckhardt encountered many obstacles and delays in making preparations 
for his assumption of the leadership of a free Hungary movement in the 
West. Soon after his departure from East Centra! Europe, dramatic events 
began to unfold. A pro-allied military coup in Yugoslavia precipitated 
Hitler's decision to postpone his planned invasion of the USSR until after 
the danger to his flank in the Balkans could be eliminated. Pressure was 
brought upon Hungary to abandon her neutrality and allow German troops 
to cross the country on their way to Yugoslavia. The situation raised the 
spectre of a British declaration of war against Hungary. Prime Minister 
Teleki tried to deflect this threat by taking his own life, to demonstrate 
that his country had been coerced into involvement in Germany 's Balkan 
venture. War with Britain was averted for the time being, but enough 
damage had been done to Hungary's stature to preclude the possibility of 
Eckhardt going to the United Kingdom to launch his planned Free Hun-
gary Movement. Nevertheless he managed to embark for the still neutral 
United States, after dodging Gestapo agents all the way from the Balkans 
to Egypt, and from there to South Africa.1 0 Eckhardt's appearance in the 
United States in August 1941 finally prompted the left-wing elements of 
the Hungarian-American community into action. 
The Hungarian-American left, unlike the right which tended to con-
centrate around the American Hungarian Federation, was by no means a 
cohesive community. There were divisions in its ranks along ideological 
and class lines, and there were differences in outlook between the "old" 
immigrants and the more recent arrivals. There were also regional rivalries, 
exemplified by the lack of cooperation among groups centred around vari-
ous metropolises such as Cleveland, Chicago, and New York. Actually, in 
discussing the Hungarian-American left, especially the non-communist left, 
it might be more accurate to talk of prominent individuals rather than of 
organizations. Some of these people had achieved their fame or notoriety 
in Hungary, others in America, and a few— like Jaszi —in both. Many of 
them had stayed away from immigrant organizational life until the wartime 
crises prompted them to political action. Perhaps the best-known among 
these luminaries was the film actor Bela Lugosi, Hollywood's own "Count 
Dracula."11 One of Lugosi 's close allies was Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, the 
Chicago-based avant-garde artist and lifetime devotee of Karolyi.12 Then 
there was Lajos Toth, described by one of his contemporaries as "an inter-
nationally recognized authority on accounting," who would lead the New 
York Council of Hungarian Americans for Victory.13 Somewhat less known 
but similarly active leftist Hungarian-American personalities were two re-
cent arrivals to America, Laszlo Fenyes (a member of the Hungarian par-
liament during the First World War) and Pal Keri. Both of these men had 
lived in European exile before their arrival in the USA, and both had been 
implicated in the murder of wartime Hungarian Prime Minister Istvan Tisza 
during the early days of the Karolyi revolution. Fenyes was acquitted at a 
trial held in 1920, while Keri was convicted —he was released from prison 
several years later and went into exile. Still another prominent Hungarian 
who would play an important role in the wartime politics of the Hungarian-
American left was Rusztem Vambery. Also a recent arrival in the US, he, 
like his friend Jaszi, was a publicist, scholar and university teacher; unlike 
Jaszi however, Vambery had never held high political office in Hungary. 
He was a professor of criminology at the University of Budapest where, 
during the Karolyi regime, he had been a dean. After the revolutionary 
interlude of 1918-19, Vambery continued his teaching career in Hungary 
until 1938 when he emigrated to the United States. There, despite his age 
(66), he resumed teaching by accepting a post at the New School of Social 
Research in New York City.14 
A bitter conflict between the Hungarian-American left and the right 
should not have been inevitable at this time or, at least, not between Eck-
hardt and Vambery. These two men had been prominent members of Hun-
gary's legal profession and were acquaintances. They had had a meeting 
when Eckhardt visited the United States in 1940 and discussed the question 
of starting a movement for a free Hungary in America should it become 
necessary. There seems to have been no evidence at the time that the two 
could not collaborate in such a venture.15 After Eckhardt returned to the 
United States in August 1941, he met with Vambery again and outlined 
his plans for the movement. While the two agreed that there was a need 
for such action, they now came to the conclusion that they better pursue 
their aim of rallying Hungarian Americans to the anti-Nazi cause through 
separate organizations. Eckhardt believed that the majority of "patriotic 
Hungarians" would not support a movement in which Vambery and his as-
sociates took part, while Vambery felt that he was no longer in a position 
to cooperate with Eckhardt. Nevertheless, the two apparently agreed not 
to obstruct each other 's work.16 
Soon after his meeting with Vambery, Eckhardt completed his prepa-
rations for the launching of his "Independent Hungary" movement and 
issued a manifesto outlining its aims. The declaration began by arguing 
that Hungary's independence had been "destroyed" when that country had 
been "tricked" into the war as Germany's ally. Hungarians living in free 
countries had "the sacred duty to give voice to the genuine convictions of 
the Hungarian people and to take up the fight against Nazi domination." 
The proclamation's authors also declared that the existing Hungarian gov-
ernment did not represent the aspirations of the Hungarian nation. Next, 
the statement announced the establishment of an executive committee to 
lead the fight for an "Independent Hungary," and called on all Magyars 
living in freedom to endorse this movement.17 
No sooner than Eckhardt 's plans became public knowledge, personal 
attacks on him started, some of them by Vambery 's own associates. The 
change in the Vambery group's attitude toward Eckhardt and his movement 
probably had a lot to do with the activities of Mih£ly Karolyi in England — 
the other aspirant to the leadership of Hungarians in the free world. Ever 
since Hungary's involvement in the war against Yugoslavia in the spring of 
1941, Karolyi had contemplated launching a movement of free Hungarians 
living in Britain and the Americas. The 66-year-old former statesman, 
politically isolated and not in the best of health, needed allies. To help him 
with organizational work, he chose Count Karoly Lonyai, a man with close 
links to the Czechoslovak government-in-exile.18 The two of them turned to 
Jaszi and Vambery to organize the American branch of the movement. In 
a message addressed to Jaszi, Karolyi outlined its requirements and aims. 
The immediate goal was to separate the true anti-fascists from the "Trojan 
horse crowd" congregating around Eckhardt, by denouncing Horthy for 
selling out Hungary to Hitler. The long term aim would be the building 
of a democratic Hungary: the ending of feudalism and capitalism, radical 
land reform, the establishment of producers' cooperatives and so on. Such a 
program, Karolyi believed, would be welcomed by progressive Hungarians 
everywhere, but would be unacceptable to Eckhardt 's potential followers.1 9 
In response to Karolyi 's plea, the American Federation of Democratic 
Hungarians (AFDH) was brought into being in September at a meeting 
in Cleveland, Ohio. On its executive were Vambery and Jaszi, as well 
as Ignacz Schultz, a recent arrival from occupied Czechoslovakia.20 The 
organization's headquarters were established in New York City. Its news 
organ became the bulletin, Hare [Combat], but it was also supported by 
another newsletter, Igazmondo [The Truth Teller].21 
The AFDH leadership's attitude to Eckhardt was illustrated by an article 
that Schultz published at the time in the periodical, The Nation. This front-
page declaration, entitled "Budapest 's Fake Mission," denounced Eckhardt 
as an anti-Semite and anti-democrat and an agent of the "feudal coterie 
which rules Hungary by the grace of Hitler." Schultz then went on to paint 
a black picture of the regime in power in Budapest.22 The AFDH's platform 
was couched in less vituperative language, but was equally strident. "We 
make no difference," began the document's second paragraph, "between 
Hitler and Horthy." It called on members of Hungary 's armed forces "to 
go over to the enemies of Hitler and Hungary," and on the Hungarian 
population to sabotage the Axis war effort. It also rejected the alterations 
to Hungary's boundaries that had taken place since 1937. Concerning the 
country 's future, the AFDH's platform called for a democratic postwar 
Hungary at peace with its neighbours, and demanded the abolition of the 
monarchy and the dissolution of the nobility's and the churches' estates.23 
The AFDH, together with the Hungarian-American communist press, 
managed to frustrate Eckhardt's efforts to mobilize the Hungarian immi-
grant community behind his Independent Hungary Movement. More im-
portantly, the A F D H and their allies helped to cast enough doubt over 
Eckhardt 's figure in the eyes of Allied authorities to make his movement a 
stillborn venture.24 On the other hand, the Jaszi-Vambery coalition was un-
able to rally the Hungarian-American community behind its efforts. So, 
the search for the creation of a credible lobby to represent Hungarian 
Americans had to continue. This effort followed a two-pronged approach. 
One was aimed at the creation of a new organizational structure for the 
Hungarian-American left that was more acceptable both to the Hungarian 
immigrant community and the authorities in Washington, especially the 
State Department. The other aspect of the search was the attempt to reach 
an accommodation with the less "compromised" members of Eckhardt 's 
entourage. 
To realign the organizational structure of the Hungarian-American left, 
the AFDH, at its annual meeting in New York City in September 1942, 
launched the movement New Democratic Hungary (NDH). NDH was to 
step into the shoes of Eckhardt 's Independent Hungary movement which 
had suspended its activities during the summer. The leadership of the 
AFDH evidently believed that with their conservative rivals in disarray, 
they could bring into being a lobby under whose umbrella a wide range 
of Hungarians opposed to the Axis could gather. They also cherished the 
hope that NDH would be able to achieve effective cooperation with emigre 
groups from other Central European countries, and that through creating 
a high-profile movement, they would be in a better position to further the 
cause of Mihaly Karolyi. The executive of the new organization was made 
up entirely of recent arrivals: Vambery became its president and Laszlo 
Fenyes its vice-president.25 
The time seemed propitious for attracting converts to the NDH. With the 
demise of Eckhardt 's movement, it should have been easy to draw some of 
its prominent followers. The prime target of the AFDH' s effort was Antal 
Balasy, one-time deputy head of the Hungarian legation in Washington. 
Balasy, who had sought diplomatic asylum in the United States in Novem-
ber 1940, was known in Allied diplomatic circles as an honest man with a 
liberal outlook. Though for some time he had been a follower of Eckhardt, 
he still managed to retain his reputation as a professional diplomat of im-
peccable credentials. He could have been a solid asset to the organization, 
even though his following among Hungarian immigrant masses was very 
limited. Negotiations with Balasy had been initiated before Eckhardt 's 
resignation from the Independent Hungary Movement. At the time, the 
purpose of the discussions was a possible reconciliation between the patri-
otic and the progressive Hungarian camps in America. On 15 April 1942, 
Vambery and Balasy met, but failed to achieve concrete results. Vambery 
was unhappy with Balasy's disinclination to condemn the Horthy regime, 
while the latter was doubtful of Vambery 's ability to command respect 
among Hungarian Americans, and, especially, among Hungarians in gen-
eral, or even to control others in his group.26 Contacts with Balasy were 
resumed after Eckhardt 's resignation as leader of the Independent Hungary 
Movement, but, unfortunately for the people behind the NDH, the attempt 
to recruit Balasy failed.27 
Another man the NDH planned to approach was the recently arrived 
renowned composer, Bela Bartok. While Balasy's joining the new move-
ment would have increased its credibility in the eyes of the State Depart-
ment, the winning of Bartok to the movement 's cause would have elevated 
the NDH's profile in Hungarian-American circles and with the broader 
American public. Regrettably for the NDH, Bartok remained an elusive 
target. He, in fact, was soon recruited by those members of the Hungar-
ian American Federation who sought to breathe new life into Eckhardt 's 
discredited Independent Hungary Movement.28 
Still another project for the newly launched N D H was the continuation of 
efforts to bring Mihaly Karolyi to the United States. This undertaking had 
its origins with Karolyi himself. In the late summer of 1941 he had come 
to the conclusion that if he were to lead "democratic" Hungarians outside 
of Hungary effectively, he would have to transfer his operations from the 
United Kingdom to the United States. Accordingly, in September of that 
year he asked his American supporters to plead with the State Department 
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to grant him a visa. Unfortunately for Karolyi, the State Department 
showed no interest in letting him come to America. Nor did authorities 
in Washington change their mind when the AFDH officially endorsed the 
cause of Karolyi 's planned move and began campaigning for his admission. 
The failure of these efforts was to have a damaging effect on the prospects 
of a Vambery-Jaszi coalition. Already during September 1942, a number 
of influential members of the movement expressed dissatisfaction with the 
leadership of the AFDH especially in regard to its inability to secure a 
visa for Karolyi.30 This group, lead by Laszlo Moholy-Nagy and a few 
of his Chicago associates, decided to go it alone and undertake their own 
vigorous campaign to bring Karolyi to the United States. In time, they 
would establish a separate organization, the Hungarian-American Council 
for Democracy.31 
The launching of the NDH then did not solve the problems of the 
Vambery-Jaszi group. Authorities in Washington were correct in their ini-
tial assessment that "the formation of the New Democratic Hungary move-
ment [left] the situation largely unchanged."32 The movement did not gain 
the desired wide-scale support for its leaders; on the contrary, it lead to a 
further proliferation of anti-Axis Hungarian organizations, and to the frag-
mentation of community leadership. Furthermore, the conservative wing 
of the Hungarian-American community had not been neutralized. Even 
though Eckhardt had been driven from prominence, nothing could prevent 
him from continuing his diplomatic maneuverings behind the scenes, and 
from wielding considerable influence in Hungarian emigre affairs. 
For the balance of the war, America's "democratic" Hungarians would 
expend much time and effort to influence both Hungarian-American and 
Allied opinion, and would continue to launch new organizational undertak-
ings to this end. They would win some skirmishes in their war against the 
"patriotic camp," but would never see their work crowned by substantial 
success. 
Jaszi 's precise role in this work, both before and after 1942, has not been 
documented. Both contemporary and latter-day commentators refer to him 
as the leader, or one of the leaders of the Hungarian-American democratic 
left. This assessment seems appropriate in view of the facts that he had been 
one of the founders of the AFDH —and later became its president —and he 
had helped to launch the movement for a New Democratic Hungary. He 
held no office on the NDH's executive only because the State Department 
frowned upon the participation of American citizens in organizations of 
recent political refugees. Even some members of the patriotic camp of 
the Hungarian emigre community in North America acknowledged Jaszi 's 
abilities as a leader and organizer. In a conversation with then American 
secret serviceman Allen Dulles, Balasy described Jaszi as the "ablest of the 
Vambery [s/c] group . . . idealist and honest [though] pretty well discredited 
because of his connections with Karolyi. . . ,"33 Indeed, throughout this 
period, Jaszi was one of Karolyi 's chief contacts in the US. One of his 
acquaintances described him as an " uncompromising though not uncritical 
fr iend" of the Count. "He knows the erratic mind, and all the other faults of 
the former Hungarian President, but, rightly or wrongly" believes Karolyi 
to be "the man" to lead a "Free Hungarian movement."34 
Aside from supporting Karolyi 's cause and involvement in the work 
of the AFDH and the NDH, Jaszi continued to write on Hungarian sub-
jects. Much of what he produced appeared in the North American English-
language press, but Jaszi also joined the ranks of those experts who reported 
on Hungarian affairs to America 's wartime intelligence agency —the Office 
of Strategic Services (OSS). Large fragments of one of his studies have 
survived in the OSS records. It is an essay on the "Hungarian Problem" 
that Jaszi wrote in the spring of 1944, evidently in response to a journalistic 
report that appeared in the British press at the end of March, assessing the 
Hungarian situation after the occupation of Hungary by the Wehrmacht. 
The report came from the pen of Noel Panter, a former special corre-
spondent of The Daily Telegraph stationed in Budapest. Panter disagreed 
with those journalists who, after the German occupation, tended to portray 
Hungarian Premier Miklos Kallay "as a liberal minded man fallen victim 
to Nazi malevolence," and reminded his readers that in 1942 Kallay went 
around "making speeches emphasizing Hungary 's duty to the Axis." Panter 
concluded his report by saying that "Hungary 's occupation [was] but the 
natural development of a policy pursued during the past twelve years. . . ." 
[The Daily Telegraph, 31 March 1944] 
Jaszi was evidently impressed by Panter 's analysis. So much so that 
he wrote a lengthy memorandum, entitled the "Hungarian Problem," in 
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support of it. On the question of Hungary 's German orientation, which 
Panter had emphasized, Jaszi offered a different explanation. "This Ger-
man orientation," Jaszi argued, was not of recent origin as Panter indicated, 
but it had been a "well thought out policy of a series of Hungarian gov-
ernments. . . . since the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, which 
guaranteed the leading role of the German bourgeoisie in Austria and the 
feudal classes in Hungary. . . ." By "at least the beginning of the 20th 
century," he continued, "it was evident to all," that this system "was col-
lapsing." Progressive thinkers throughout the monarchy "recognized that 
the growing crisis could only be cured by the introduction of universal 
equal suffrage with secret ballot . . . [and the replacement of] the dualistic 
structure of the monarchy . . . by a kind of federalism giving equal rights 
to the Slavs and the other nationality groups." 
The Austrian bourgeoisie was not the prime barrier to such reforms, ac-
cording to Jaszi. Indeed, universal suffrage by secret ballot was granted in 
Austria in 1907. The "greatest obstacle" to reorganizing the Monarchy and 
to introducing universal suffrage in Hungary, was the "Hungarian feudal 
parliament." This legislature, in Jaszi's words, was "absolutely dominated 
by the landed aristocracy" and capitalists "utterly at the disposal of the 
lords." This "feudal system" sought to maintain the latifundia and "the 
great economic privileges which [it] enjoyed. . . " and to safeguard "the 
exclusively Magyar character" of Hungary. "The very idea of a federal 
structure," Jaszi continued, "was regarded as treason, and even the ac-
knowledgment of the existence of the nationality problem was punished by 
social and political ostracism." Moreover, "feudal" Hungary continued to 
impede the solution of the Monarchy's nationality problem even during the 
war. "When it became evident in 1917 thai the war was lost, the young 
emperor Charles made . . . efforts to appease the disgruntled national mi-
norities of Austria by the promise of federalism, but . . . he did not dare 
to promote the same thing in Hungary, afraid of the ire" of the Hungarian 
ruling elite. The emperor 's efforts were in vain, and the Monarchy "broke 
into pieces." 
Next, Jaszi outlined the efforts of the government that he had served 
over two decades earlier: 
In Hungary, the government or Count Michael Karolyi. . . , tried 
to undo the vices of the past. The most needed democratic reforms 
were immediately voted: universal suffrage, dismemberment of the 
large estates, and national autonomy for the minorities. Unfortunately, 
economic collapse, social unrest, and the military occupation of the 
country made the execution of these laws impossible, and the na-
tional minorities of the country repudiated the idea of federalism and 
preferred to build up their own states with their brethren beyond the 
frontiers. Economic misery and national despair provided fertile soil 
for the Bolshevik emissaries. At the same time, the feudal forces of 
the country. . . , regained their vitality and began to plot with the re-
actionaries of England and France against the People's Republic [sic] 
of Karolyi. . . . 
After the postwar peace settlement, Jaszi went on, there were "two roads 
open" to Hungary's governments. One was "to follow the policy initiated 
by the Republic," and the other was "to disregard and to undermine the 
peace treaty . . . to foment the spirit of irredentism, to concentrate all 
the energies of the country for the restoration of the old frontiers and 
to maintain the privileges of the feudal oligarchy. . . ." All post-1919 
governments in Budapest, Jaszi asserted, had pursued the "second road 
without the slightest endeavor for democratic reforms or for bringing about 
a tolerable compromise" with the Successor States. 
In subsequent text Jaszi turned to an analysis of the policies of the 
Horthy regime. Concerning foreign affairs, he pointed out that "the feudal 
aristocrats of Hungary never liked the parvenu Hitler. . . " but believed 
that the "danger of Nazism could easily be counterbalanced by the power 
of Mussolini." In domestic affairs the "feudal aristocracy" lost some of its 
influence to "Fascist elements." "Already during the shortlived Republic 
. . . the first signs of a Fascist terrorist system were manifest. . . ." 
The "type of Fascism" that developed in Hungary, Jaszi felt compelled 
to add; 
was far nearer to the Nazi than to the Italian type. Several years 
before the advent of Hitler, a Hungarian type of Nazism grew up quite 
independently which anticipated many aspects of the Nazi ideology. 
It was an uncritical, exasperated and romantic philosophy of hatred 
and revenge. It emphasized the inalienable historic rights of Hungary 
to her old frontiers. It was a "stab-in-the-back" legend to the effect 
that Hungary was never defeated, that her collapse was exclusively 
due to the propaganda of the Allies, the Jews, and the Communists. 
The fight against the Jewish danger was one of the chief demagogic 
forces of the movement. . . . A vehement anti-Marxian campaign 
was carried on . . . Instead of socialism or communism, a "Christian 
National Social State" [was called for]. A doctrine of racial purity 
was proclaimed. . . , This mystic racism and wild nationalism paved 
the way for . . . a rapprochement with Nazism always with the hope 
that no exclusive pressure could be exercised by Germany . . . 
The Hungarian leadership's hope of counterbalancing the influence of Hitler 
with that of Mussolini met with disappointment, and the country drifted 
closer and closer to the Third Reich. With the coming of World War II, 
Jaszi continued, "the old secret dream of the irredentist policy seemed 
to become a reality: the countries of the Little Entente were destroyed or 
paralyzed and the dictators began the fulfillment of their promises to restore 
Hungary 's territorial integrity. . . ." 
The German orientation, proved to be a mixed blessing. . . . The 
half million German minority, in the past a politically powerless ele-
ment, assumed more and more the position of a privileged nationality 
and the pressure of the German general staff and the Gestapo hurt 
considerably the interests of the ruling Magyar classes. Hungary be-
came more and more a German colony . . . German competition was 
painfully felt when Nazis were put into the key positions, whereas the 
feudal aristocracy was increasingly menaced with subversive activities 
of the Fascist organizations which began a demagogic campaign for 
the dismemberment of the large estates. 
Jaszi 's next paragraphs were devoted to depicting "the misery of the 
small peasantry and of the landless proletariat" and exploitation of work-
ers and intellectuals by the "Magyar oligarchy and its Nazi allies." To 
support his arguments, Jaszi cited the works of a "group of young Hun-
garians, mostly descendants of peasant families. . . , [who] produced an 
amazingly . . . well documented literature in which the sufferings of the 
Magyar peasantry were unveiled." Next, Jaszi cited statistics compiled by 
these populist writers demonstrating that Hungary of the times was indeed 
the land of "three million beggars." The war and the territorial gains that 
it brought, he went on, did not alleviate the situation of Hungary 's poor, 
but confounded it as a result of massive deliveries of foodstuffs to Ger-
many, the demands of the war effort on the eastern front and the growth of 
"hatred between the Magyar and the non-Magyar races . . . in the recon-
quered territories." Referring to "atrocities . . . committed by the armies 
of occupation against both the Carpatho-Ukrainians and the Serbs" and the 
spread of "the spirit of wrath and revenge," Jaszi predicted that "[it] wil! 
be a hundred times more difficult to solve the nationality problem after the 
war than it would have been any time after [1867]. . . ." 
In the following section of his essay, the author lashed out at Hungary's 
wartime leadership. These people were not quislings, "persons who became 
traitors to the[ir] country through motives of sordid economic interest or 
base ambition." Jaszi had no doubt that there were "thousands of people 
in Hungary who belong to this category and who became Nazi servants 
out of such motives." But Hungary's actual leaders were "conscious pro-
moters and partly even originators of the system under which Europe is 
suffocating." And he continued: 
The Hungarian oligarchy and its capitalistic satellites have followed 
for a hundred years both a national and international policy that drove 
the country ultimately into Fascist servitude. [They abandoned the] 
tradition of . . . Kossuth . . . and, instead of introducing the neces-
sary social and national reforms . . . they embarked upon a policy of 
social-economic oppression and forcible denationalization of the alien 
groups. In spite of repeated admonitions and the lessons of the revo-
lu t ions ] of 1848 and 1918, they continued to maintain the antiquated 
privileges of the ruling aristocracy. Because this could not be done 
without foreign protection, the Magyar oligarchy accepted Hapsburg 
domination first, the leadership of the German Kaiser during the first 
World War next, and finally Fascist hegemony, which ultimately led 
to Nazi supremacy. . . . 
The main motive for this was not class or "personal interest as some sim-
plifiers of history state." Though the "economic interest" of the landown-
ers have played an "important role," Jaszi believed that Hungary 's leaders 
"were influenced . . . by a complex of ideologic motivesf:] the exagger-
ated and misguided feeling of patriotism, the haughtiness of an old warrior 
class, and the belief in their own historical mission." 
In the penultimate section of his essay Jaszi turned to the subject of 
Hungary 's future prospects. In his opinion these depended very much 
on the "international policy of Soviet Russia." The Soviets had already 
repudiated the "idea of the federalization" of East Central Europe. They 
had also made it clear that they will not deal with "any government which 
they cannot trust." Evidently the national "ruling oligarchies" had to be 
"replaced by new social and political forces which in their very nature 
would feel a strong affinity with the aims of Soviet Russia." Jaszi never 
doubted that "old feudal Hungary would be unacceptable to the rulers of 
Russia" and so it would be eliminated. "The only possibility for Hungary to 
come to terms with the Soviets and to safeguard her cultural and national 
independence. . . ," Jaszi concluded, "would be to create a democratic 
republic of the peasants, workers, and creative intelligentsia which could 
not be used in fomenting a hostile coalition . . . against Russia." He then 
added with a touch of pessimism, that the Russian leaders might opt for 
the "complete sovietization of the whole region" as they had done in the 
case of the Baltic states. In the end, however, he remained optimistic. 
A situation could easily arise in which the Soviet leaders would hes-
itate to embark upon a policy which would arouse the distrust and 
the indignation of the Western democracies and of the United States 
whose economic and technical cooperation will be badly needed in 
the enormous work of reconstruction of Russia. Furthermore, in the 
post-war period the air and naval supremacy of Great Britain and the 
United States will be so thoroughly established that the realistic leaders 
of the Soviets would not risk a conflict . . . The complete and sincere 
democratization of this region would make an aggressive policy [by] 
Russia unnecessary and would rob it of all ideologic pretexts. 
And Jaszi went even further. "It is possible. . . h e argued, that through 
the reform of Hungarian (and Yugoslav and Rumanian) society, and the "in-
creasing socialization" in the "economic life" of Western democracies, the 
Soviets could be persuaded to abandon their "objection against a federal-
ization" of East Central Europe. Perhaps Soviet Russia itself might embark 
on the "democratization" of her own political order. "In order to inaugu-
rate such an evolution," Jaszi concluded, "it would be absolutely necessary 
to [do away with] the Danubian and the Balkan danger zone . . . Such a 
transformation could only be the work of the peasants, the workers and the 
creative intelligentsia of this region." 
Thus ended Jaszi 's 1944 analysis of the "Hungarian problem." At the time, 
many of his Hungarian compatriots would have declared this essay trea-
sonous, while others might have called it an astute and realistic assessment. 
The treatise remains controversial even from a historical distance of nearly 
half-a-century. It is not easy to decide whether it is brilliant synopsis or 
journalistic polemic. Perhaps it is a combination of both. It has its insights, 
but contains many biased statements. There is also a strain of righteousness 
and even vindictiveness in its tone. H k speculations concerning the future 
reveal Jaszi as an eternal optimist whose views are tinged with a degree of 
naivete. 
Most disturbing is the very opening of Jaszi's essay, the treatment of 
Hungary 's alleged or real long-term pro-German orientation —subject mat-
ter which prompted Jaszi to undertake his analysis of the "Hungarian prob-
lem" in the first place. Here Jaszi seems to be especially unreasonable 
in depicting the Hungarian governments of 1867-1914 as being "pro-
German"—especially in the 1944 context of that phrase which implied 
a pervasive sense of evil. One would have thought that the Hungarian 
fathers of the 1867 Compromise, in preserving a constitutional link with 
Austria, rather than being evil or shortsighted, were the epitomes of polit-
ical wisdom. Rather than serving narrow class or ethnic concerns —which 
they did in a way, but only coincidentally — they acted in the best interest 
of all peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy. Nor can we equate Hungar-
ian loyalty— lukewarm at best with many Hungarians —to Emperor-King 
Francis Joseph with enthusiasm for Hitler. 
There is even more to this charge of the Hungarian elite 's "pro-German-
ness." Jaszi himself can be said to have been tainted with it, a fact which 
he conveniently forgot or ignored in 1944. In 1915, however, he had 
been a supporter of Friedrich Naumann's Mitteleuropa plan, envisaging 
the postwar union of the lands of the principal Central Powers. True, at 
this time Jaszi saw in a liberal postwar Germany the force to counteract 
the influence of an autocratic Russia, and he soon abandoned his dallying 
with a German orientation. Nevertheless, three decades later, he would 
condemn interwar Hungary's leaders some of whom saw in a revitalized 
Germany a potential ally in their struggle to amend the blatantly unjust 
provisions of the post-1918 peace settlement. 
A similar problem exists with Jaszi 's accusation that the "feudal elite" 
of Hungary opposed the federal restructuring of Hungary before 1914, and 
even during the last year of the war. While this had indeed been the 
case, Jaszi 's record is not such that he can make this charge lightheartedly. 
Though ever since the 1920s Jaszi has been known as one of the foremost 
promoters of Danubian federalism, his pre-1919 record is not such that 
allows him to castigate his aristocratic compatriots. In his famous 1912 
book on nationality problem he rejected the idea of the federal reorgani-
zation of the Kingdom of Hungary.36 Even in his 1918 proposal for the 
federal union of East Central Europe, Hungary (excepting Croatia which 
had had its autonomy already) remained a single administrative unit.37 It 
was only in the late autumn of that year, when Hungary 's territorial disin-
tegration had reached an advanced stage, that Jaszi and his associates in the 
Karolyi government 's Ministry of Nationality Affairs came up with plans 
to turn Hungary into a federation of autonomous cantons, on the pattern of 
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Switzerland. 
In dealing with the Karolyi era of postwar history, Jaszi reveals himself as 
a skillful apologist. In suggesting that the reform efforts of this period were 
undermined by Hungary's "feudal forces" plotting "with the reactionaries 
of England and France," he engages in the kind of myth-making which he 
finds repulsive when used by the conservatives who blame the socialists 
and their allies for the ills that befell Hungary after the war. In attacking the 
Horthy regime in general, Jaszi often uses half-truths or outright falsehoods. 
In suggesting that Hungary's post-1919 regime should have followed the 
path charted in 1918-19, he ignores the fact that in those years the left of 
the Hungarian political spectrum had thoroughly discredited itself in the 
eyes of Hungary 's populace. Implicating the Hungarian leadership in the 
1934 assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia can today be deemed 
historical falsification: the real culprit was Mussolini, but the international 
community at the time refused to blame him lest he be driven into an 39 
alliance with Hitler. Jaszi might not have known this fact, which suggests 
that he was as much a victim of anti-Hungarian propaganda as he was a 
perpetrator of it. 
Jaszi's treatment of the war period also leaves much to be desired for 
historical accuracy and fairness. In stressing the "atrocities" committed by 
Hungarian troops in the reoccupied Hungarian territories, Jaszi ignores the 
fact that these incidents were the exception rather than the rule in those days 
of conflict, and can hardly be compared to what was taking place elsewhere 
in occupied Europe. In especially condemning Hungary 's aristocrats, Jaszi 
makes another omission: he ignores the fact that it was precisely certain 
members of this class (Prime Minister Count Pal Teleki and former Prime 
Minister Count Istvan Bethlen, in particular) who opposed the German 
alliance. To call such people not even "quislings" but "the conscious pro-
moters . . . of the system under which Europe is suffocating," is at best 
complete insensitivity and at worst, slander. 
In assessing future possibilities, Jaszi differentiates himself from many 
left-wing intellectuals of the time. He does realize that the Soviets might 
ride roughshod over the countries of East Central Europe and impose 
Soviet-style authoritarianism on them, but is naive enough —easily said 
with the benefit of hindsight —to believe that Moscow might end its oppo-
sition to a federation of East Central Europe. It was even more naive for 
Jaszi to hope that the Soviets, rather than imposing Stalinism on this part 
of the world after the war, would begin the democratization of Russia — 
especially if the countries of Eastern Europe, and even those of the West, 
would embark on building socialist societies. As this socialist transforma-
tion of the West never happened (or, at least, not in the manner Jaszi had 
in mind), we cannot know whether if it had, Soviet Russia would have 
started along the path to democratization after the war, as Jaszi had pre-
dicted. Knowing the nature of Stalin 's regime, however, we can now call 
this prediction profoundly simplistic. 
The democratization of Russia was to begin four decades later, mainly 
for reasons that Jaszi could not have foreseen. Interestingly enough, the 
elimination of the "Danubian and Balkan danger zone" in Europe did not 
precede that democratization. In fact, that sore spot only intensified in 
the wake of political changes in Russia. It may well be that Jaszi is still 
correct in his prediction that the elimination of this "danger zone" remains 
a precondition of the successful completion of Russia 's democratization. 
Whether Jaszi 's other, final prophesy — that the solution of the Danubian 
and Balkan problem can be only the work of the "peasants, the workers 
and the creative intelligentsia" —is valid, only time will tell. 
* * * * * 
Much research remains to be done if we are to arrive at a comprehensive and 
fair assessment of Jaszi's activities and thinking during the Second World 
War. Without this research, historical evaluations of this subject must 
remain tentative. Nevertheless, such sources of information as archival 
collections —such as records of the Office of Strategic Services and those 
of the State and Justice departments in Washington — as well as Jaszi 's own 
publications and the limited historical literature that deals with this period 
of his life, allow us to begin a stock-taking of his wartime work and draw 
some preliminary conclusions about his reactions to the Second World War 
and, in particular, to Hungary's involvement in it. 
The years 1941 to 1945, not unlike the years from 1914 to 1919, seem 
to have been a period of intense organizational and intellectual activity for 
Jaszi. He corresponded, mediated, organized and, above all, wrote about 
subjects close to his heart. His situation was, of course, vastly different 
during these two critical phases of his life. During the First World War he 
had been a well-known figure in Hungary, a prolific publicist, a respected 
scholar and an aspiring opposition politician. He could look forward to a 
future in a postwar world which he believed would be brighter than that 
which had preceded the war and laid the seeds for its inevitable outbreak. 
In contrast, during the Second World War he was an emigre academic with 
little influence with the general public of both his adopted and native lands. 
In fact, he was isolated even from the masses of Hungarian Americans; and, 
as a resident of Oberlin, Ohio, he had limited influence in such centres of 
Magyar emigre life as Chicago and New York. 
By the early 1940s, moreover, Jaszi was past his prime, a fact which 
influenced not so much his capacity to work, but his intellectual vigour. 
In the years prior to 1919, he was much more likely to come up with 
original analysis of complex issues. In those days his work and outlook 
seem to have been oriented towards the future. During the Second World 
War he did exhibit a degree of interest in looking ahead, but in thinking 
and writing about what the postwar era might bring, Jaszi kept looking to 
the past, to the year 1918 when —as he no doubt believed —opportunities 
had been missed and history had taken a wrong turn adversely affecting 
both his country's evolution and his own fortunes. 
Even a cursory examination of Jaszi 's World War II work and writings 
reveals that his immediate post-World War I experience had a profound 
and lasting effect on him. The collapse of the regime he had served, the 
rejection of his own program for the reorganization of East Central Europe 
and the emergence in Hungary of a political system almost diametrically 
opposed to his ideals had dealt Jaszi an emotional blow from which he 
seems not to have recovered. It is this mind-set that helps to account for 
his relentless opposition to the regime in Budapest, and which explains 
why the struggle against this regime preoccupied his spirit and consumed 
his energy during the war years of 1941-45. The more he saw his enemies 
in Hungary on the verge of political collapse and moral bankruptcy, the 
more strident his attacks on them became. In certain respects, it seems then 
that when he wrote his essay on the "Hungarian Problem" in 1944, Jaszi 
was continuing a fight that he had lost —but in his view only temporarily — 
in 1918-19. As a result, this work is not so much the kind of incisive 
analysis that we associate with Jaszi the scholar of the pre-1914 period, but 
the polemic of a disappointed, elderly man. In observing Jaszi 's wartime 
assault on the reputation of the Horthy regime, one is also tempted to 
wonder if for him fighting German Nazism had not taken second place to 
combating Hungarian "feudalism," 
Jaszi 's work and writings during World War II, not unlike what happened 
during World War I, had no immediate impact on the final outcome of the 
war and the evolution of postwar Danubian Europe. There are those who 
would argue that his writings in particular had a lasting negative effect 
on Hungary's reputation. Although targeted at the "feudal coterie" that 
he perceived as ruling his country throughout his lifetime, his polemical 
observations probably reflected on the whole Hungarian nation, and gave 
ammunition —and continue to do so even today —to those who wish to 
discredit Hungary and Hungarians in general. The aim of a patriotic states-
man is to serve his nation. The person who forgets his aim and redoubles 
his effort is a fanatic, to paraphrase George Santayana. One is tempted to 
wonder to what extent Jaszi 's relentless tirades against "feudal" Hungary 
make him a true leader of the Magyars, or a political zealot. 
Whether Jaszi ' s —and Vambery 's , Karolyi's, Fenyes's, etc.— diatribes 
against Horthyite Hungary had significant impact on Allied policies during 
the war is doubtful. Most Allied statesmen and officials knew enough 
to take the arguments of the Hungarian "progressives" with a grain of 
salt. London's and Washington's anti-Hungarian stand, as manifested in 
their rejection of Eckhardt as a spokesman for Hungarians of the Atlantic 
democracies, was based on other considerations: that the Horthy regime — 
and anyone even vaguely associated with it such as Eckhardt —was not 
acceptable to the Czech government-in-exile, which, after all, was an ally 
in the war against the Axis. In rejecting the Horthy regime then, Jaszi 
and his associates were, on the "side of the angeis" in World War 11. 
Unfortunately for them, even this stand failed to ensure them a measure of 
lasting success. 
The post-1945 era was to bring new disappointments for the septuagenar-
ian Jaszi. Under occupation by the Red Army, Hungary's future remained 
as uncertain as ever. What saddened him even more was the political out-
look adopted by the countries of East Central Europe regarding minorities. 
This manifested itself through intolerance, discrimination against and the 
wholesale deportation of ethnic groups. These were the very policies that, 
in the 1941-44 context, Jaszi deemed to have harmed relations among the 
peoples of the region in a way never experienced during the life of the Dual 
Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. What hurt Jaszi the most was the fact that 
these attitudes surfaced even —one might say especially— in Czechoslo-
vakia, a country that for him had been a beacon of hope in the post-1919 
period. For Jaszi then, World War II ended very much the way the First 
World War had a quarter century earlier. It brought him anguish mixed 
with excitement and hope, but in the end and above all, disappointment. 
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Appendix 
Document 1 
The Hungarian Problem 
Editor 's notes: 
The following document is reproduced from the records of the wartime 
Office of Strategic Services (RG 266, regular series, 1941-45, doc. 
no. 79021), deposited in the National Archives of the United States 
(NAUS). The document 's first page contains an excerpt from a March 
1944 press report by Noel Panter. Its second page is the second page 
of an essay, apparently entitled "The Hungarian Problem." The first 
page of this essay has not been located. The OSS index to RG 266, 
regular series, identifies Oscar Jaszi as the author of this essay, and 
gives July 1, 1944 as the time of its receipt by the agency. The 
document was declassified, at the request of N.F. Dreisziger, on 25 
Feb. 1991. (Authority NND 750140). N.F.D. is indebted to the 
staff of NAUS for declassifying this (and other) OSS document(s) for 
him, and to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada for providing him with a research grant that made his research 
in Washington and elsewhere possible during 1990-91. 
In the reprinting of this document, the original spelling of cer-
tain words was retained, even though this is unconventional (e.g. Ju-
goslavia instead of Yugoslavia) or is not used by our journal (e.g. 
Hapsburg instead of Habsburg). 
Declassified 
The Hungarian Problem 
The essence of the Hungarian situation was admirably stated by an En-
glishman, Noel Panter, for several years a special correspondent of The 
Daily Telegraph and Morning Post stationed at Budapest who wrote in the 
March 31, 1944 issue of his paper the following introductory remarks to a 
careful and well informed article: 
"Hungary's occupation is but the natural development of a policy pursued 
during the past twelve years. To do the rulers of Hungary justice they never 
concealed or camouflaged their intentions or predilections. They were and 
are revisionist and pro-Axis. Leaders of a nation which cannot forget, 
which has 'No , no, never' as its watchword, and much of whose misery 
and discontent was born of defeat could not well have acted otherwise. 
Kallay, whom there is just now a tendency to represent as a liberal 
minded man fallen victim to Nazi malevolence, was in May, 1942, engaged 
making speeches emphasizing Hungary's duty to the Axis and threatening 
'with whip and gallows' all those who failed to appreciate the sign of the 
times. . . ." 
[the rest by Jaszi, starting on p. 2 of his essay] 
T h e Hungar ian P rob lem 
II 
This German orientation, however, which Mr. Panter describes, did not 
originate after the first World War and the dismemberment of Hungary but 
it has been a well thought out policy of a series of Hungarian governments. 
This policy was a logical and inevitable continuation of the dominant cur-
rents of Hungarian Public life since the Austro-Hungarian Compromise 
of 1867, which guaranteed the leading role of the German bourgeoisie in 
Austria and the feudal classes in Hungary. 
By at least the beginning of the 20th century it was evident to all un-
biased observers, both Hungarians and foreigners, that the Dual System, 
established by the Compromise or 1867, was collapsing. Both the Austrian 
and the Hungarian parliaments were paralyzed by obstructionism. The na-
tional minorities in both countries which constituted the majority of the 
population in the Hapsburg monarchy, accused the system of giving unjust 
advantages to the Germans and Hungarians to the detriment of the other 
national groups. 
All the progressive elements in both Darts of the monarchy recognized 
that the growing crisis could only be cured by the introduction of universal 
equal suffrage with secret ballot which would make an end to the domi-
nation of the German and the Magyar oligarchies. The resistance of the 
leading German bourgeoisie was not very strong, for the parliamentarian 
reform was advocated by labor, the national minorities, and even very in-
fluential elements around the court and in the general staff who understood 
that the Hapsburg monarchy, without popular support, must necessarily 
succumb. Under the pressure of all these groups who found great sup-
port in the energetic personality of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, universal, 
equal, and direct suffrage was introduced in Austria in 1907. It became 
more and more a common opinion of advanced thinkers that the dualistic 
structure of the monarchy must be replaced by a kind of federalism giving 
equal rights to the Slavs and the other nationality groups. 
The greatest obstacle to this reform and to universal suffrage was the 
Hungarian feudal parliament. Its Upper House had a strictly medieval 
character and the Lower House was absolutely dominated by the landed 
aristocracy and the financial capitalism utterly at the disposal of the lords. 
This feudal system had two main objectives. One was to maintain the lati-
fundia and the great economic privileges which feudal agrarianism enjoyed 
by its predominance in the dualistic set-up. Its second main objective was 
to safeguard the exclusively Magyar character of the state against the will 
of at least one half of the population. The very idea of a federal structure 
with the other nationality groups, especially the Slavs, was regarded as 
treason, and even the acknowledgment of the existence of the nationality 
problem was punished by social and political ostracism. 
Ill 
The reactionary forces in Hungary, under the leadership of Count Stephen 
Tisza, made a parliamentarian reform in Hungary impossible and the nation-
ality tension in the monarchy assumed more and more dangerous features 
in the form of the various irredentas. Especially the gravity of the Southern 
Slav problem grew continuously and led to the assassination of the heir ap-
parent, Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The clash between Pan-Slavism and 
Pan-Germanism became inevitable. Following the German suggestion Vi-
enna used the assassination of Francis Ferdinand as a pretext for starting a 
war to crush Serbia, the leader of the Southern Slav movement. 
When it became evident in 1917 that the war was lost the young emperor 
Charles made some desperate but belated efforts to appease the disgruntled 
national minorities of Austria by the promise of federalism, but even in the 
last hour he did not dare to promote the same thing in Hungary, afraid of 
the ire of the Hungarian feudalism. In vain did the last Hapsburg invoke the 
principle of self determination in the Wilsonian sense and ask the people 
of Austria to form their own governments and to confederate. None of the 
peoples, not even the loyal Germans, heeded the imperial manifesto. 
The Austro-Hungarian monarchy broke into pieces in a few days, each 
national unit establishing its own government. In Hungary, which soon 
became a republic, the government of Count Michael Karolyi, returning 
to the traditions of 1848, tried to undo the vices of the past. The most 
needed democratic reforms were immediately voted: universal suffrage, 
dismemberment of the large estates, and national autonomy for the mi-
norities. Unfortunately, economic collapse, social unrest, and the military 
occupation of the country made the execution of these laws impossible, 
and the national minorities of the country repudiated the idea of federalism 
and preferred to build up their own states with their brethren beyond the 
frontiers. Economic misery and national despair provided fertile soil for 
the Bolshevik emissaries. At the same time, the feudal forces of the coun-
try, alarmed by the immediate danger of the expropriation of their estates, 
regained their vitality and began to plot with the reactionaries of England 
and France against the People's Republic of Karolyi. The illfamed note 
of the allied powers presented by Col. Vyx to the Budapest government, 
shifting the line of demarcation laid down in the armistice and compelling 
the Republic to evacuate purely Hungarian territories, aroused such nation-
wide indignation that the Karolyi government abdicated and gave place to a 
socialist government that immediately compromised with the Communists. 
A Soviet Republic was proclaimed (March, 1919) which soon collapsed 
under the bayonets of the Rumanian army. 
IV 
After the dismemberment of Hungary, carried out long before the Treaty of 
Trianon went into effect, there were only two roads open to the subsequent 
governments. One was to follow the policy initiated by the Republic: 
to democratize the country, to carry out the agrarian reform, to lay the 
foundation for a free peasantry, and to establish an honest compromise 
with the neighboring states tending toward a future federal structure. The 
other was to disregard and to undermine the peace treaty negotiated by the 
Horthy government itself, to foment the spirit of irredentism, to concentrate 
all the energies of the country for the restoration of the old frontiers and 
to maintain the privileges of the feudal oligarchy and its satellites. 
All the governments after the fall of the Republic pursued constantly the 
second road without the slightest endeavor for democratic reforms or for 
bringing about a tolerable compromise with the Succession States. . . . 
[T]he most significant fact of the new regime was the treaty of friend-
ship with Italy, April, 1927, which meant the closest relationship with Fas-
cism. . . . For years Italy was glorified as the chief protector of Hungarian 
irredentism and when the Nazi power began to grow, the Hungarian leaders 
were convinced that the danger of Nazism could easily be counterbalanced 
by the power of Mussolini. As a matter of fact the feudal aristocrats of 
Hungary never liked the parvenu Hitler and his crude demagogic method. 
They cherished the old type alliance with the Prussian Junkers but regarded 
the Nazi regime with a certain amount of distrust, even disgust. 
V 
The chief aims of [Prime Minister] Count [Istvan] Bethlen, however, were 
only incompletely realized. The feudal aristocracy lost its former political 
leadership to the advantage of Fascist elements. Already during the short-
lived Republic under Karolyi the first signs of a Fascist terrorist system 
were manifest. The violent "Awakening Magyars" (under the leadership 
of the then little known Tibor Eckhardt) and similar secret organizations 
caused a considerable amount of bloodshed among workers and Jews. In 
this connection an important fact must be emphasized. The type of Fascism 
that developed in Hungary was far nearer to the Nazi than to the Italian 
type. Several years before the advent of Hitler, a Hungarian type of Nazism 
grew up quite independently which anticipated many aspects of the Nazi 
ideology. It was an uncritical, exasperated and romantic philosophy of ha-
tred and revenge. It emphasized the inalienable historic rights of Hungary 
to her old frontiers. It was a "stab-in-the-back" legend to the effect that 
Hungary was never defeated, that her collapse was exclusively due to the 
propaganda of the Allies, the Jews, and the Communists. The fight against 
the Jewish danger was one of the chief demagogic forces of the movement. 
The slogan "Third Hungary" was coined, which would bring unity and the 
restoration of the old frontiers to the country. A vehement anti-Marxian 
campaign was carried on; hated books were burned on the streets. Instead 
of socialism or communism, a "Christian National Social State" should be 
established. A doctrine of racial purity was proclaimed, which found a 
glorification in the Turan myth. Regent Horthy himself organized a Knight 
Order of feudal character (the so-called Vitezek), the members of which 
received hereditary landed property for the defense of the country against 
"subversive elements." 
This mystic racism and wild nationalism paved the way for many leaders 
of the oligarchy toward a rapprochement with Nazism always with the hope 
that no exclusive pressure could be exercised by Germany, because of the 
prominent influence of the glorious Duce. The successor of Bethlen, Julius 
Gombos, of an extreme Fascist and anti-Semitic type, introduced promises 
of vast social reforms, opposed the restoration of the Hapsburgs, but made 
cooperation with Fascist Italy even closer. When Hitler came to power and 
much Nazi propaganda and money came into the country, Gombos visited 
Berlin in June, 1933, and in July he journeyed to Rome. His main objective 
was to gain both Fascist and Nazi support for the territorial claims of Hun-
gary. This policy assumed an openly inimical character against the Little 
Entente in the signing of the Rome Protocol, and culminated in the assas-
sination of King Alexander and Foreign Minister Barthou at Marseilles in 
October of the same year, leading to serious international complications as 
the connivance of the Italian and of the Hungarian governments in the or-
ganization of the plot was well known. Very soon, however, the influence 
of the German dictator prevailed and the formation of the Rome-Berlin Axis 
in October, 1936, signified the surrender of Austria. This was effectively 
carried out in March, 1938, and in the February of the next year the govern-
ment of Paul Teleki joined the anti-Communist pact of Germany, Japan, and 
Italy. In the increasingly aggressive policy of the Nazis, Hungary shared 
in the loot of Czechoslovakia, occupying Slovak and Carpatho-Ukrainian 
territories. 
With the beginning of World War II the Hungarian policy for the Axis 
became even more accentuated. With the war the old secret dream of 
the irredentist policy seemed to become a reality: the countries of the 
Little Entente were destroyed or paralyzed and the dictators began the 
fulfillment of their promises to restore Hungary's territorial integrity. Half 
of Transylvania and a parji, of the Jugoslav kingdom were returned to the 
Crown of St. Stephen. The German orientation, however, proved to be a 
mixed blessing for the country. The half million German minority, in the 
past a politically powerless element, assumed more and more the position 
of a privileged nationality and the pressure of the German general staff and 
the Gestapo hurt considerably the interests of the ruling Magyar classes. 
Hungary became more and more a German colony both from the political 
and economic point or view. German competition was painfully felt when 
Nazis were put into the key positions, whereas the feudal aristocracy was 
increasingly menaced with subversive activities of the Fascist organizations 
which began a demagogic campaign for the dismemberment of the large 
estates. 
VI 
Behind these various developments the old wound of the country was still 
open. The latifundla system exercised the old-time pressure upon all the 
energies of the country: the misery of the small peasantry and of the land-
less proletariat remained unaltered and the industrial working class and 
the intelligentsia of the towns and cities suffered under the exploitation of 
the Magyar oligarchy and its Nazi allies. A group of young Hungarians, 
mostly descendants of peasant families, introduced a movement which has 
much resemblance to the Narodniki movement of Czarist Russia in the 
19th century. They produced an amazingly prolific and well documented 
literature in which the sufferings of the Magyar peasantry were unveiled. 
This literature is a flaming protest against existing conditions. Though not 
daring to acknowledge it, and camouflaging their propaganda by national 
and racial slogans, they returned to the main objectives of the October rev-
olution of 1918. The essential causes of the Hungarian sickness remained 
practically the same and the Narodniki literature never tired of reiterating 
them. On the basis of the statistics of Hungary under the Trianon frontiers 
they asserted that: 1,232 large estates (over 1,400 acres) representing 0.1% 
of the total number of separate agricultural holdings, cover 30% of all the 
land. The average size of a large estate is 5,61 S acres. The 1,142,294 small 
properties (under seven acres), representing 71% of all agricultural hold-
ings, cover an area of 2,486,838 acres; i.e.,11% of all the land. A small 
proprietor has an average holding of 2.13 acres. Forty per cent of the agri-
cultural population has no landed property at all; and if one adds to this 
number the category of small proprietors, mentioned above, who cannot 
live on their minute lots, but eke out a starvation wage as occasional work-
ers on the large estates, one reaches a figure of around 3,500,000 out of an 
agrarian population of about 4,500,000. That is to say, almost 80% of the 
total agrarian population lives on the outer fringe of proletarian existence. 
This situation has given rise to the oft-repeated slogan: "the three million 
beggars of Hungary." 
VII 
The adventurous foreign policy of the Magyar oligarchy and its territorial 
gains did ru)t bring any relief to the oppressed classes of Hungary. On 
the contrary, the administrative and economic pressure has grown in direct 
proportion to the regained provinces. Enormous amounts of foodstuffs 
were taken to Germany, workers were transferred for convict labor, and 
thousands of soldiers perished in the offensive against the Russians. And, 
what is even worse, the hatred between the Magyar and the non-Magyar 
races grew enormously in the reconquered territories. Unheard of atrocities 
were committed by the armies of occupation against both the Carpatho-
Ukrainians and the Serbs. The whole area is full of the spirit of wrath and 
revenge. It will be a hundred times more difficult to solve the nationality 
problem after the war than it would have been any time after the Ausgleich 
of 1867 and to protect the truly Hungarian interest, both economic and 
cultural, will be an even harder task than it was after Trianon. 
If we look over this whole story it will be evident how erroneous it is to 
speak of Hungarian Quislings. By quislings we mean persons who became 
traitors to the country through motives of sordid economic interest or base 
ambition. It cannot be doubted that there exist many thousands of people in 
Hungary who belong to this category and who became Nazi servants out of 
such motives. These people, however, are only the personal subordinates 
of the chief actors of the drama. The real actors are not quislings of the 
Germans, but the conscious promoters and partly even originators of the 
system under which Europe is suffocating. The Hungarian oligarchy and 
its capitalistic satellites have followed for a hundred years both a national 
and international policy that drove the country ultimately into Fascist servi-
tude. The tradition of the great Hungarian liberal of the period of 1848, 
of Kossuth and his collaborators, was abandoned and, instead of intro-
ducing the necessary social and national reforms in favor of the peasants, 
the proletariat and the national minorities, they embarked upon a policy 
of social-economic oppression and forcible denationalization of the alien 
groups. In spite of repeated admonitions and the lessons of the revolution 
of 1848 and 1918, they continued to maintain the antiquated privileges of 
the ruling aristocracy. Because this could not be done without foreign 
protection, the Magyar oligarchy accepted Hapsburg domination first, the 
leadership of the German Kaiser during the first World War next, and finally 
Fascist hegemony, which ultimately led to Nazi supremacy and to World War 
II. 
It would be unfair to assert that the responsible leaders of this policy 
were primarily or exclusively motivated by selfish, personal interest as 
some simplifiers of history state. Though in their policy the economic 
in teres ts ] of the great landowners have played an important role, it cannot 
be doubted that they were influenced above all by a complex of ideologic 
motives. Among these were the exaggerated and misguided feeling of 
patriotism, the haughtiness of an old warrior class, and the belief in their 
own historical mission. 
VIII 
In the light of the previous analyses it is clear that no better future for 
Hungary can be expected without introducing the following fundamental 
reforms: 1) thoroughgoing democratization of its antiquated political and 
administrative structure; 2) a democratic land reform on the basis of the 
distribution of the large estates and in building up a free peasant class on a 
cooperative basis; 3) a reasonable compromise with the neighboring states 
with the elimination of irredentistic agitation, paving the way toward a 
federal structure. 
It is equally clear that the plan of a Danubian confederation is utterly 
Utopian as long as the present Hungarian economic and social structure 
continues; the feudal lords of Hungary and their Fascist followers will 
never cooperate with countries which have a really democratic structure. 
Similarly, a military dictatorship in Jugoslavia and the corrupt dynastic 
structure in Rumania or the military absolutism which followed it, would 
never accept the idea of a Danubian cooperation. It is significant, how-
ever, that whenever the peasantry of the Danubian region found genuine 
leaders the idea of federation was immediately proclaimed. So Kossuth 
after the collapse of the Hungarian war for independence, the Croat Radic, 
the Bulgarian Stambolisky, and the Rumanian Maniu after the first World 
War, unfolded the flag of a Danubian confederation, further expanded by 
Benes in the hour of the Czech disaster towards the program of a European 
federation. 
IX 
With the smashing military victories of the Soviet Union which will make 
it in all probability the strongest continental power in Europe the future of 
Hungary and of the Danubian states will depend to a large extent on the 
international policy of Soviet Russia. Two things are already sufficiently 
clear in the foreign policy of the Soviets: One is that they repudiate the idea 
of the federalization of the small states with the argument that the social 
and political structure of these countries are so different that there is no 
possibility whatsoever for the establishment of a solid and stable federal 
structure among them. The idea of federalization could only follow the 
necessary readjustments in the social-economic structure of those countries. 
The other fundamental point in the Russian foreign policy is their claim 
that they will not recognize any government which they cannot trust. The 
states of the Danube and the Balkans should not follow a foreign or military 
policy hostile to the Soviets. Therefore, the former ruling oligarchies which 
through their continuous intrigues were always instrumental in creating 
hostile coalitions against Russia, must be eliminated and replaced by new 
social and political forces which in their very nature would feel a strong 
affinity with the aims of Soviet Russia. 
It cannot be doubted that old feudal Hungary would be unacceptable to 
the rulers of Russia and they would try to crush them either by military 
means or by fomenting social revolution. It would be easy for the Soviets 
to use the unsolved agrarian problem of Hungary for the complete sovieti-
zation of the country —the same thing which they did in Russia after the 
revolution. The only possibility for Hungary to come to terms with the 
Soviets and to safeguard her cultural and national independence follow-
ing her Western traditions would be to create a democratic republic of the 
peasants, workers, and creative intelligentsia which could not be used in 
fomenting a hostile coalition, cordon sanitaire, against Russia. 
The leaders of the Soviets have expressed repeatedly these ideas con-
cerning Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Rumania. They have 
promised that under these conditions they would respect the free and inde-
pendent political, cultural, and economic life of those countries. It is very 
probable that they will accept this point of view. A renitent [sic ?] Hun-
gary would be either crushed by a hostile alliance under Russian leadership 
or it would be only tolerated as long as its final collapse would not emerge 
automatically through bloody social convulsions leading to some form of 
proletarian dictatorship. 
X 
Whether this point of view of the Soviets is a sincere one or simply a 
transitory tactical position before the complete sovietization of the whole 
region, is a controversial issue which will depend primarily on the final 
outcome of the World War. It is sure that Russia made the same promises 
to the Baltic states and she disregarded them incorporating those countries 
completely into the Soviet structure. Yet the problems of the Danubian and 
Balkan regions are quite different both from a geographic and a political 
point of view. A situation could easily arise in which the Soviet leaders 
would hesitate to embark upon a policy which would arouse the distrust and 
the indignation of the Western democracies and of the United States whose 
economic and technical cooperation will be badly needed in the enormous 
work of reconstruction of Russia. Furthermore, in the post-war period the 
air and naval supremacy of Great Britain and the United States will be so 
thoroughly established that the realistic leaders of the Soviets would not 
risk a conflict for the rather ideologic advantage of the sovietization of 
Central Europe. The complete and sincere democratization of this region 
would make an aggressive policy of Russia unnecessary and would rob it 
of all ideologic pretexts. 
In this way the remolding of the antiquated social and economic structure 
of Hungary, Jugoslavia, and Rumania would be the essential prerequisite for 
the establishment of an at least transitorily stable and peaceful Danubian 
and Balkan region. In this new atmosphere many things could happen 
toward a final stabilization. It is possible that the basic ideologic and 
economic differences between the democracies and the Soviets could be 
substantially mitigated, that Russia could abandon her objection against 
a federalization of the smaller nations whose friendliness could be tested 
and that a common cooperation with the other states in an international 
organization could give to the Soviets a new impetus for common efforts in 
the solution of the German and the Japanese problems. Besides, there can 
be no doubt that mighty currents are developing in Soviet Russia toward 
the democratization of her own structure, the limitation of the autocratic 
tendencies of the dictatorship, and the realization of an effective bill of 
rights. At the same time the inevitable trend in the Western democracies 
toward increasing socialization of their economic life would all contribute 
to make the antagonism between the two worlds less acute. 
In order to inaugurate such an evolution it would be absolutely necessary 
to make an end to the Danubian and the Balkan danger zone, to that keg of 
dynamite which has already twice exploded, driving the whole world into 
turmoil and disaster. Such a transformation could be only the work of the 
peasants, the workers and the creative intelligentsia of this region. 
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Introduction 
BY DR. OSCAR JASZI 
In such cataclysmic times as these past history becomes living history. 
Everyone feels that, without understanding the past, reasonable and re-
sponsible men cannot plan for the future. This is the reason why every 
group or individual who tries to shape the future endeavors to prove that 
the policy which he favors is in the line of historical development. 
This is the reason why the forgotten history of Hungary becomes again 
interesting reading. Books and pamphlets are written exclusively to show 
that the shameful role of the present Hungarian government, in being a 
vassal of the Axis, has nothing to do with its sins, or the sins of those 
who shaped the politics of the last four generations: but that it was simply 
imposed upon the present rulers by a fate for which they are not responsible. 
This thesis masks for the benefit of the Allied democracies a double-
crossing game. Should the Axis win, feudal Hungary will enjoy all the 
territorial gains made with the help of the dictators. Should the Axis be 
crushed, the so-called Free Hungarians will establish an alibi by reiterating: 
"Poor democratic and liberal Hungary was compelled by armed force to 
join the Nazis, and Admiral Horthy and his government have carried out 
this policy with bleeding hearts." 
In the essay which follows, Professor Vambery raises his voice against 
the falsifications of history which are involved in the previous argument. 
Nobody is more qualified to do this than he. One of his chief merits is the 
fact that he has never been a politician. Somebody has rightly called him 
the Voltaire of Hungary. He has been interested mainly not in the changing 
trends of the political game but in the supreme values of human dignity 
and liberty of thought. As a noted criminologist he has studied the Calvary 
of the human race, and he has felt that it is not enough to write textbooks 
and learned treaties, that one must always attack the eternal citadels of 
servitude: the ignorance of the many and the entrenched privileges of the 
few. 
He was suffocating in the atmosphere of his country, the last bulwark 
of European feudalism, where the extravagant luxury of the rulers was in 
painful contrast to the starving misery of the masses. Not revolutionary 
critics but supporters of the Horthy system coined the slogan of the "three 
million beggars of Hungary" —out of a population of eight millions at that 
time. Vambery felt that man must act, and so he did. 
And when the critical date of recent Hungarian history came in 1918, 
after the defeat of the Central Powers, he wholeheartedly embraced the 
cause of the so-called October Revolution. This name is somewhat mis-
leading if we mean by "revolution" an act of conspiracy carried out by 
violence. There was no fight and no resistance in this short-lived upheaval. 
It was a by-product of the disintegration of the Habsburg monarchy. There 
was no government either in Vienna or in Budapest which could claim a 
single atom of authority. The popular forces were simply liberated by the 
collapse of the Dual system, and the soul of the country returned almost 
automatically to the traditions of the Revolution of 1848, to the spirit of 
Louis Kossuth. 
But the dawn of liberty was a very brief one. The accumulated misery 
and hatred of the war could not be appeased in a short time. The national 
minorities, mindful of the past, repudiated the extended hand of the Hun-
garian Republic; all the beneficiaries of the old system were engaged in 
fifth column activities; the emissaries of Moscow spread successfully the 
ideas of a Communist revolution; the reactionary delegates of the Western 
democracies humiliated intentionally the new regime; the illegal dismem-
berment of the country against the stipulations of the armistice heated the 
age-old nationalism of the country to the boiling point; and hundreds of 
thousands of refugees from the occupied territories flooded the capital, 
blaming the republic for their sufferings. 
The immature Communist Revolution which ousted the democratic re-
public gave to all the counter-revolutionary forces a welcome pretext for 
organizing a common front for the restoration of the old feudal order. Ad-
miral Horthy gained power with the help of the Western democracies and 
under the protection of Rumanian bayonets. 
And silence and order reigned again in Budapest . . . All the instruments 
of terror, of concentration camps, of racial mythology and persecution had 
been used systematically long before Hitler and the Nazi ideology; and 
all the achievements of the October Revolution were crushed, its leaders 
calumniated, and the feudal rule restored in an orgy of extreme nationalism 
and an officially fomented irredentism. Most of the leaders of the October 
Revolution were compelled to flee. Many of those who remained were 
imprisoned. 
The only man who could maintain his personal liberty in the country 
conquered by the counter-revolution was Vambery, because he had never 
accepted office during the Revolution, and because his connections with 
influential British circles were generally known. He had inherited many 
British friends f rom his distinguished father, Armenius Vambery, who had 
played an important role in the English diplomatic policy in the East and 
been honored by the personal friendship of the King of England. Rustem 
Vambery has maintained and enlarged this precious legacy. 
During the reign of the White Terror, Vambery fulfilled a very important 
role. He criticised courageously the regime as far as the tight censorship 
would permit. He became a kind of ambassador for the oppressed people. 
After having received the blue-prints of the Horthy press bureau and its 
multiple little favors (ably administered by Mr. Eckhardt during the heyday 
of the system), every distinguished and intelligent foreigner who tried to 
understand the situation of Hungary went into the Vambery home to hear 
the real story of the past, of the intricate machinations of the counter-
revolution, and of its diplomatic repercussions. 
In spite of insults and threats of every kind from his enemies, Vambery 
remained at his post until the final Nazi invasion. When he saw that the 
intimate cooperation of the Horthy regime with Fascism and Nazism had 
become a real alliance, and that Hungary had finally assumed all the 
features of a vassal state of Hitler, he left the country. 
Now, here in America, in noble poverty and unaided by the mighties 
of the land, who favor the Habsburgs and hidden exponents of the Horthy 
system, he continues the fight with youthful fervor. 
As a true liberal and democrat, he cannot be other than a Free Hungarian 
in the real sense. As a matter of fact he has been a Free Hungarian for fifty 
years, even in times when such a movement did not exist. Attacked by the 
pseudo-Free Hungarians, the adherents and emissaries of the Horthy system 
who are trembling for that tottering regime, Vambery has recapitulated in 
his pamphlet the past history of Hungary and exposed its repercussions in 
the present struggle. He conclusively shows that no future peace is imag-
inable in the Danubian Basin without a solution for the two fundamental 
problems of this region: the agrarian and the nationality problem. 
His logic, his conviction, and his sincerity will surely impress all unbi-
ased readers of the essay. His passion and irony are natural results of his 
life as a fighter. He may overstress here and there the economic-social in-
terpretation of the present Hungarian mentality, and perhaps underestimate 
its sentimental and historical background, but no impartial observer will 
deny that his diagnosis of the Hungarian tragedy is correct, and that the 
remedies he offers for the ills of the Hungarian people are based on real 
facts and a true analysis of the conflicting forces. 
I ardently hope that all friends of democracy and fighters for a stable 
world order, based on cooperation and justice, will give careful attention 
to his ideas. 
Oberlin, May, 1942. 
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The Platform 
of 
The American Federation 
of Democratic Hungarians 
- M a y 23, 1943-
I. We shall aid the war of the United States and the United Nations 
against the Axis Powers sincerely and honestly. We make no exception 
with respect to any member state and by all means at our disposal, deeds, 
words, writing we will endeavor to help the common struggle of the United 
Nations against the Axis to an early victory. We shall not permit that in 
the press under our influence, there should appear any writing that has 
a double meaning, is defeatist or besmirches any member of the United 
Nations. We shall do everthing to make sure that the Hungarians of the 
United States will individually and with their united force in every way do 
their duty in the interest of a successful conclusion of the war, in the first 
place as soldiers in the United States army, as workers in war industries and 
factories where they should be examples of diligence and punctuality, and 
by buying War Bonds and serving in the Red Cross and Civilian Defence. 
II. We make no difference between Hitler and Horthy nor between the 
regimes of the two countries. We equally condemn both and fight against 
their politics, aims and goals. We call upon the soldiers of the Hungarian 
army everywhere, whether fighting on Russian soil or performing the duties 
of maintaining order, to lay down their arms, to go over to the enemies 
of Hitler and Horthy, or to join those who as free troops or guerillas fight 
aginst Hitlerism. We call upon the people of Hungary to do all they can 
against the war made by Hitler and Horthy: to hide their grain, the meat, 
the feed-stuffs from the Nazis and to sabotage the work in shops, plants 
and factories. 
III. We desire that Hungary after the war shall be a democratic country 
patterned after the western democracies, that its people shall have general, 
secret and equal rights to vote, that its peasantry shall partake in a complete 
redistribution of land, that its workers should have a part in social security 
and justice and its intellectuals in complete freedom of its spirit and culture. 
We desire that Hungary 's future politics shall be built upon cooperation. 
In its economic, financial and military relations it shall be based first of all 
upon cooperation with neighboring peoples, the Czechoslovaks, Jugoslavs, 
Rumanians, Austrians, Polish, Bulgarian and Greek populations, upon close 
alliance with them as an equal among equals. Hungary shall endeavor 
sincerely to make up with its neighbors without any mental reservation, 
and to live together with them. As a precondition to this we assert that the 
system of large estates of the so-called "historical class," its privileges and 
advantages must be liquidated in favour of the Hungarian people. Similarily 
we take stand against that propaganda aimed at the Habsburg restoration 
which from the beginning was designed to influence in a one-sided way 
the decision of the Hungarian people regarding the form of government. 
IV. We recognize nothing of what was established by the gangsterwars 
of Hitler and Mussolini with the shortening of certain state boundaries or 
lengthening of others. But with complete faith in the principles laid down 
in the Atlantic Charter as well as in the prospective peace negotiations 
after a victory by the Uited Nations, we believe that Hungarian people will 
be neither punished nor deprived and that they will share as equal among 
equals in justice and brotherhood. 
V. In carrying on the war there can be no difference between us who 
make the victory of the United States and its Allies over the Axis Powers 
and their gang our goals. And because of this we desire that the population 
of the United States of Hungarian descent without regard to their religion 
and their political convictions should cooperate along the same line in the 
interest of the earliest possible victory of the United States and its Allies. In 
regard to questions which will emerge after the war, especially concerning 
Hungary's future, we do not believe cooperation is possible because the 
size and gravity of the issues demand that we should be able to present our 
principles to the masses in their entire austerity. 
"The American Federation of Democratic Hungarians." 
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES 
FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH 
September 30, 1942 
MEMORANDUM: 
Hungarian Politics in the United States 
The American Federation of Democratic Hungarians, which has stead-
fastly set itself against Tibor Eckhardt's Independent Hungary Movement, 
achieved at least one of its objectives at its annual meeting in New York, 
September 19 and 20, by bringing forth a movement to be called New 
Democratic Hungary. This will probably be closely allied with the Federa-
tion and will be headed by Rustem Vambery, noted Hungarian criminologist 
resident in the United States. The other objectives, apparently unreached, 
were said to be: (1)) to bring together a wider representation of Hungarians 
against Hitler than has hitherto been possible under the leadership either 
of Eckhardt or the Vambery-Jaszi group of the American Federation of 
Democratic Hungarians; (2) to lay the basis for effective collaboration of 
anti-Hitler Hungarians with other Central European representatives; (3) to 
develop closer relations with the movement headed in London by Count 
Michael Karolyi, onetime Hungarian prime minister. Meanwhile the Hun-
garian press in the United States indicates that despite the "temporary sus-
pension" of his Independent Hungary Movement last July, Tibor Eckhardt 
is still a political force on the Hungarian scene. Indeed the fact appears 
to be that Eckhardt remains pre-eminently the strongest individual among 
the Hungarian political refugees, and his ostensible retirement as a result 
of the doubts cast on his political motives has left a considerable void. 
The New Democratic Hungary organization excludes American citizens 
from its line-up. With Dr. Vambery as president and Laszlo Fenyes, former 
member of the Hungarian Parliament, as vice-president, the organization 
will maintain relations with the American Federation of Democratic Hun-
garians through Dr. Vambery's participation in the Federation's meetings. 
Dr. Oscar Jaszi, an American citizen of Hungarian origin, professor at 
Oberlin College, retains his presidency of the Federation. 
Leaders of the Federation are reported to have hoped that a wider rep-
resentation of Hungarian elements might be secured through contacts with 
Anthony Balasy, formerly counselor to the Hungarian Legation in London, 
and Bela Bartok, the noted musician who has sometimes been mentioned as 
a figure about whom all factions could unite. For some reason, however, 
Jaszi is said to have failed to keep an appointment which he had made 
with Balasy in Washington; and the leaders of the Federation cooled in 
their feeling toward Bartok when it was charged that he was in close con-
tact with Victor Bator, formerly chief economic adviser to the Commercial 
Bank of Budapest and lately an associate of Eckhardt 's. 
Balasy's current position is one of aloofness f rom political activities 
while he professes to be ready to join any movement uniting all individuals 
who are both Hungarian and anti-Hitler. 
The leaders of the Federation are reported to have hoped also that rep-
resentatives of other Central European countries would be on hand at their 
annual meeting in New York and that a basis might be laid for cooperation 
between the various groups. However, Charles A. Davila, chairman of the 
Free Rumania Council, refused to participate on the grounds that one of 
the Federation's officers was in the service of the Czechs. Further attempts 
were abandoned. 
A certain faction of the Vambery-Jaszi Federation has been insistently 
advocating the admission to this country of Count Michael Karolyi, now 
in London. Recently Dr. Alex Vince, Dr. Hugo Rony, and Mr. L. Moholy-
Nagy all of Chicago, resigned from the Federation on the grounds that it had 
not supported Karolyi with sufficient energy. These Chicagoans are now 
engaged in gathering ten thousand signatures which they plan to present to 
the Department of State to bolster their plea that Karolyi be granted a visa. 
It is reported that Professor Vambery had been in communication with 
Karolyi recently and at the latter's request agreed to adopt New Democratic 
Hungary as a name for the organization which Vambery now heads. This 
name is also used by the pro-Karolyi organizations in London and South 
America, but it is understood, nevertheless, that the three organizations will 
maintain complete independence. 
Observers of the Hungarian-American political scene feel that the for-
mation of the New Democratic Hungary movement leaves the situation 
largely unchanged. An organization which can draw all Hungarian in-
dividuals together for political purposes and the cooperation with other 
European groups still waits to be formed. . . . 
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Hungarian literati did come to the United States in the early post-First 
World War years but not in large numbers. One was Oscar Jaszi. In 
pre-war Hungary he had tried to raise alarm over the problem of national 
minorities which did not exist at all to the average Hungarian. Hungary 
was Hungarian and that was all; the Magyar closed his eyes to the fact that 
the highlands all around Hungary were inhabited by several nationalities, 
spilling into the plains. The then Hungarian governments, too, sought to 
"settle" the nationality problem by pretending that it did not exist. Jaszi 
knew that such "solutions" could only be temporary and that Hungary's 
future could not be assured unless she reached agreements with her mi-
norities which almost formed a majority. He contended most emphatically 
that as a uninational State Hungary was an absurdity and that she must be 
transformed into a multi-national country. Not far distant f rom Hungary's 
western marches he saw a successful solution of this problem. Switzerland 
was inhabited by four different nationalities speaking as many languages, 
drawing from four different traditions, German, French, Italian and Roman-
sch, often antagonistic to one another. In spite of this, Switzerland was 
prosperous and the very image of peace. Instead of fighting each other, 
the four nationalities were engaged in amicable competition. Here was a 
ready-made example for Hungary and, possibly, some of her neighbors. 
The idea of "Eastern Switzerland" was born. Each "canton" of Eastern 
Switzerland would be delimited along ethnic frontiers and would possess a 
large measure of self-government. An ideal blend would result by combin-
ing the constructive qualities of these peoples who in the past had defeated 
their own aims by working at cross purposes. Before the war, the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy was a political monstrosity, since it took no account 
of the most dynamic force of the age, nationalism, while at the same time 
it was an economic necessity because it united a variety of interdependent 
regions producing most of the essentials of economic life. Oscar Jaszi fol-
lowed in the traditions of Lajos Kossuth, who, in later life, saw the solution 
of the Southeastern European problem in the formation of a Danubian fed-
eration of friendly States, dependent upon their own strength rather than 
serving as cat's-paws for foreign interests. 
Under the First Hungarian Republic, headed by Count Karolyi, Oscar 
Jaszi served as Minister of Nationalities. Hungary had been defeated and 
the remedies that might have helped when the minorities were begging 
for concessions were of no use whatever now that they held the whip 
hand, and not even Jaszi 's earnest endeavors could turn the scales. He 
personally had numerous friends among the nationalities, but Hungary's 
friends were few. The former servants in mistress Hungary 's mansion now 
had become mistresses themselves. Jaszi went into exile after the downfall 
of the Hungarian democratic Republic and, preceded by high reputation in 
scholarly circles, eventually reached the United States. Here he accepted 
a position on the faculty of Oberlin College in 1925, became professor 
of political science, and taught there for fully seventeen years, his fame 
reaching into many corners of the United States. He wrote a standard 
book, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy and made many notable 
contributions to books and scholarly periodicals. After the Second World 
War he saw his ideas about Hungary's future vindicated, as it became 
crystal clear that the region of the mighty Danube was a unit. 
Appendix 
Document 6 
Editor's note; The following document is the text of the introductory 
remarks made at the Oscar Jaszi Memorial Conference at Oberlin 
College by Curtis L. Kendrick: 
When Oscar Jaszi joined the faculty of Oberlin College in 1925, he had 
a distinguished reputation as an Hungarian scholar and statesman. He 
had been one of the founders of the Hungarian Sociological Society, and 
for about twenty years, editor of the monthly review, Twentieth Century 
(Huszadik Szazad). He had taught at the Universities of Kolozsvar and 
Budapest, and published many books and articles. He had been a bold ad-
vocate of political and economic changes in the pre-war Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy; as Minister of Nationalities in the liberal Karolyi government 
of 1918, he had worked for a democratic federal solution to the problem 
of national minorities and for basic agrarian reforms. 
Exiled from his native land by the Communists and by the reactionary 
Horthy regime, he continued his fight against dictatorship and war. Liberal 
emigres from many European countries have paid tribute to the value of 
his counsel and support. Oberlin takes pride in the fact that his most 
famous book, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, was completed 
in the early years of his Oberlin professorship. This book, which earned 
the admiration of American scholars, was followed by a ^trenni of articles 
and lectures on the explosive problems of Danubia and on the urgency and 
difficulties of effective international organization. During the Second World 
War, he made several broadcasts to Hungary for The Voice of America. 
Oscar Jaszi quickly became, and remained, an important member of 
the faculty community of Oberlin College. He had an accurate grasp of 
Oberlin 's problems and potentialities, and a deep loyalty to its welfare. He 
carried conscientiously and effectively the large and small responsibilities 
of a professor and a department chairman. He had an influential voice in the 
making of college policy, to which he brought both practical judgment and 
clearly thought-out principles. Few men have been less concerned with 
the trivialities of the academic vocation; perhaps none have been more 
concerned with the essentials. 
For seventeen years Oscar Jaszi was one of Oberlin 's greatest teachers. 
His forceful character, his pungent humor, and his urbane courtesy won the 
affection of his students; the substance of his teaching assured their imme-
diate interest and their lasting respect. At a time when American study of 
government was still largely legalistic and descriptive, he introduced his 
students to a different type of study. He took them beyond the regions of 
familiar liberal constitutions into the new and troubled regions of Fascist 
and Bolshevik rule. He insisted that no student could hope to understand 
the government of a country without learning something of the sociological 
background of its constitution and of the international equilibrium in which 
the country was involved. He taught his students to try to assess the na-
tionalist and socialist tendencies that were in varying degrees affecting the 
development of all continental countries. At a time when many Americans 
innocently debated over disarmament, the League of Nations, neutrality 
legislation, and the Oxford Pledge, his students had clear warning of the 
harsh social, political, and economic forces that were driving the world to 
a crisis that no international machinery could prevent and no isolationism 
could avoid. His teaching, like his scholarship, was an indissoluble blend 
of responsive realism and stern idealism. His skepticism about quick and 
easy cures was combined with a deep faith in traditional liberal values and 
in the moral capacity of free men. His students learned not only to look 
realistically at the world they must live in, but also to understand something 
of the conflict of values beneath the surface of events. His teaching was a 
continual challenge to their sense of moral responsibility. . . . 
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